The Lachin Corridor, connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, remains blocked by Azerbaijan, as the region continues to grapple with supply shortages amid calls for its reopening.
Nagorno-Karabakh has been under blockade since December last year and has experienced increasingly severe food, medicine, and energy shortages since. The Red Cross and the Russian peacekeeping mission stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh have been unable to deliver supplies and humanitarian aid since June.
Stepanakert announced on Saturday its willingness to receive humanitarian aid sent by the Russian Red Cross through Azerbaijan-controlled territory, a change in position that came hours after the region’s parliament elected Samvel Shahramanyan as president, replacing Arayik Harutyunyan.
Nagorno-Karabakh officials stated that they would accept the delivery of humanitarian aid via the Aghdam–Stepanakert road due to ‘acute humanitarian problems’. It added that an agreement was reached ‘at the same time’ to allow Russian peacekeepers and the Red Cross to resume their transport of humanitarian aid via the Lachin Corridor, which connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.
However, the Lachin Corridor remains closed despite the arrival of one lorry of Russian humanitarian aid from Aghdam on Tuesday.
The blockade continues
Authorities in Baku and Stepanakert have mutually exchanged accusations and blame for the closure of the Lachin CorridorLachin.
On Thursday, Nagorno-Karabakh’s former state minister Ruben Vardanyan accused Azerbaijan of having ‘renounced established agreements’ in not allowing goods to be transported through the Lachin Corridor following the transportation of Russian humanitarian aid through Aghdam.
Artak Beglaryan, another former State Minister, has said that despite Aliyev’s regime had reneged on its promise to reopen the Lachin Corridor once humanitarian aid entereds the region via Aghdam.
The genocidal Aliyev regime has once again lied.
They publicly promised that once a truck enters from Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Lachin Corridor would be opened in 24 hours.Over 38 hours’ve passed since the entry of a RU truck, but the Lachin Corridor remains blocked.
— Artak Beglaryan | #StopArtsakhGenocide (@Artak_Beglaryan) September 13, 2023
However, Aykhan Hajizada, spokesperson for the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, blamed the continued closure of the Lachin Corridor on Stepanakert.
‘As Azerbaijan noted during high-level contacts with the US and other partners, Azerbaijan agreed to the issue of the simultaneous use of these two roads through the ICRC. Unfortunately, the party that prevents the implementation of this agreement is the puppet regime created by Armenia in the Karabakh region.’
In mid-August, Nagorno-Karabakh reported that a 40-year-old man starved to death in the region, as authorities in Stepanakert warned of the blockade’s effect on the public health sector and vulnerable groups — children, pregnant women, people with chronic diseases, people with disabilities, and the elderly.
The region has also grappled with an acute shortage of fuel and electricity supplies from Armenia, which has led to blackouts and the suspension of public transport, cutting settlements off from each other.
[Read more: ‘Bread is all we have’: Nagorno-Karabakh’s population faces threat of starvation]
Calls for the Lachin Corridor’s opening
Both Russian and Western officials have commented in the days since the delivery of aid via the Aghdam road, with Western officials calling for the Lachin Corridor’s opening while Russian officials have maintained a more neutral position.
On Friday, Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that ‘different options are being discussed and worked out with the parties’, while refusing to directly comment on a question regarding the need to reopen the Lachin Corridor.
Following the delivery of Russian humanitarian aid to the blockaded region, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated her expectation that the Lachin Corridor would be reopened, and that humanitarian aid would ‘regularly enter the region from both directions’.
Russian President Vladimir Putin also attempted to assuage fears of potential violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, stating that Baku had told Moscow that it ‘is not interested in any ethnic cleansing whatsoever’.
In the West, top EU diplomat Joseph Borrel reiterated that while the opening of the Aghdam–Stepanakert road could be ‘part of the solution’ to the blockade, it should not be an alternative to the Lachin Corridor.
In a call with 🇦🇿 Foreign Minister @Bayramov_Jeyhun, I reiterated my concerns regarding the humanitarian situation facing Karabakh Armenians.
The Lachin corridor must be re-opened now. Other roads, such as Aghdam, can be opened as part of the solution, but not an alternative.
— Josep Borrell Fontelles (@JosepBorrellF) September 9, 2023
On Tuesday, European Council President Charles Michel similarly stated that the EU considered delivery of Russian humanitarian aid through Aghdam ‘an important step that should facilitate the reopening also of the Lachin corridor’. He also called on all parties ‘to show responsibility and flexibility in ensuring that both the Lachin and the Aghdam–Askeran route will be used’.
‘We reiterate our strong belief that the Lachin corridor must be unblocked, in line with past agreements and the ICJ Order, and underline our belief in the usefulness also of other supply routes, for the benefit of the local population,’ Charles Michel said.
Earlier this week, the US State Department expressed its concern about ‘the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh’, and called for the ‘immediate and simultaneous opening of both corridors’ to allow the movement of ‘desperately-needed humanitarian supplies’ to Nagorno-Karabakh.
In a press briefing on 11 September, State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller also urged the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to not take any actions that could raise tensions in the region.
Earlier, Miller had stressed the importance of opening the Lachin Corridor as well as the Aghdam road, urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to come to an ‘ultimate agreement’.
Also in Washington, Mike Abramowitz, the president of American rights watchdog Freedom House, stated that the blockade of the Lachin Corridor ‘risks ethnic cleansing of the region’s Armenian population’.
‘We urge the Azerbaijani government to engage sincerely in peace talks, refrain from weaponising the security of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, and unconditionally open the blockade to guarantee unimpeded two-way movement of people, vehicles, and cargo along the Lachin corridor’, stated Abramowitz.
Freedom House also urged the UN Human Rights Council to appoint a special rapporteur ‘to assess the human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.’
For ease of reading, we choose not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply a position on their status.
Abkhazia’s Foreign Minister Inal Ardzinba has warned citizens that improving Georgian–Russian relations could threaten Abkhazia, while also suggesting that Georgia was prepared to attack the region given the opportunity.
Just under two weeks after Ardzinba was rumoured to have resigned from his position, the foreign minister has begun a series of meetings with local residents in Abkhazia’s towns and cities.
The stated subject of the meetings, which began on 18 August, is Abkhaz–Russian relations in light of the 15th anniversary of the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence by Russia. However, observers have noted that much of Ardzinba’s focus has been on a bill allowing the sale of real estate to foreign citizens, in light of the perceived threat that closer Georgian–Russian relations pose to the region.
The ‘law on apartments’ has been the subject of heated debate since it was first proposed at the end of 2022. Activists and opposition politicians state that the bill aims to make it possible for non-Abkhazians to buy property, and so gain residence.
Russian officials have over the years pushed for Abkhazia to allow Russian citizens to move to and buy property in Abkhazia, a move the authorities and civil society there have resisted, with many suggesting that such a possibility would threaten Abkhazia’s sovereignty.
However, government officials including Ardzinba have voiced strong support for the legislation, claiming that building and selling apartments could be a significant source of income for Abkhazia.
Their rhetoric has also increasingly shifted focus to the supposed dangers that threaten Abkhazia’s residents if the law is not adopted.
Russian–Georgian relations and the threat of war
While meeting local representatives, Ardzinba has warned that relations between Russia and Georgia are growing closer, and that Russia has significant interest in Georgia, in particular as a transit country. Ardzinba has suggested that Abkhazia must ensure it remains an attractive prospect to Russia, otherwise it will risk falling by the waysides of diplomatic processes.
‘Today, [Georgia’s] air traffic with the Russian Federation has been restored, today the visa-free regime between Georgia and Russia has been resumed’, noted Ardzinba at a meeting in Sukhumi (Sukhum) on 13 September.
[Read more: Russia lifts travel restrictions for Georgians]
He added that over 500,000 cargo vehicles entered Georgia from Armenia and Turkey and travelled towards Russia in 2022, and stated that Russian–Georgian trade turnover amounted to $2.5 billion, compared to $3.5 million for Russian–Abkhazian trade.
‘Russia has become Georgia’s number one trading partner’, said Ardzinba. ‘What kind of trade turnover will there be between Russia and Georgia tomorrow?’
Ardzinba explicitly tied developments to the EU, UN, and OSCE-led Geneva International Discussions, which have brought together representatives of Georgia, Russia, the US, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia at quarterly meetings since the August 2008 War.
‘You can imagine the importance of the position of the Russian Federation on this platform. Everything there depends to a large extent on Russia. And if God forbid, the balance of our relations with the Russians changes, then it will be tough for us,’ says Inal Ardzinba.
Ardzinba also suggested that Georgia had two potential approaches to Abkhazia, the first of which was involvement without recognition, the second, military conflict.
‘The Georgians, with the support of the Americans, through free healthcare, through the work of non-governmental international organisations, will be able to attract our people, involve our people, and thus, as they say, solve the problem of Abkhazia. This is a soft scenario, this is what we saw in many post-Soviet countries, what happened, unfortunately’, said Ardzinba.
Since Ardzinba has taken office, he has been hostile towards international organisations working in Abkhazia and cooperation with external partners, leading to the closure of a number of civil society organisations and projects.
Regarding an armed conflict, Ardzinba stated that Georgia was preparing for military intervention and had attack drones ready for use.
‘When there was an attempt at a military rebellion in Russia, we received information that as soon as the situation in Russia changed, the Georgians were ready to carry out an offensive operation against our country. A plan for this operation using those very attacking drones has already been prepared’, Ardzinba asserted.
Expressing ‘thanks to Russia’
Ardzinba also focused both on the potential recognition of Abkhazia by Belarus, and the alleged debt of gratitude that Abkhazia owed to Russia.
‘If we are expanding our international contacts, it is thanks to Russia, if we have partners on whom we can rely, this is to a large extent, in the overwhelming majority of cases, thanks to Russia’, said Ardzinba. ‘It is difficult to imagine the Nicaraguans or Venezuelans who are on the other end the world wondering whether they should recognise Abkhazia.’
Ardzinba also praised an agreement on dual citizenship signed between the Abkhazian and Russian governments, which has yet to be signed by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. He went on to criticise protests against the transfer of the Pitsunda state dacha to Russia’s Federal Security Service, claiming that the issue had complicated Abkhaz–Russian relations.
Speaking on 14 September, Ardzinba said that Belarus had ‘de facto economically recognised’ Abkhazia, and the Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka had promised duty-free trade between Belarus and Abkhazia.
The foreign minister has in recent weeks been at the centre of two scandals. Regarding allegations that Inal Ardzinba provided a former employee of Abkhazia’s Presidential Administration with fake documents relating to opposition leader Adgur Ardzinba, the foreign minister refused to comment.
However, he stated that rumours regarding his resignation last week had been prompted by a discussion with colleagues as to whether he would be of greater benefit in Sukhumi or Moscow, which, according to Ardzinba, his colleagues took as meaning that he was saying goodbye and leaving Abkhazia.
For ease of reading, we choose not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply a position on their status.
As the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh drags on, the performance of the Russian peacekeepers charged with providing security on the road in and out of the territory is coming under closer scrutiny than ever before. And the reviews, from all sides, have been scathing.
Under the harsh spotlight of the constant coverage by pro-government Azerbaijani media, the peacekeepers have appeared uncertain of how to manage the belligerent protesters that have managed to shut down the road for four days and counting. On some occasions the Russians are easily pushed around by the protesters and reporters, on others they lose their patience and lash out.
The performance has only deepened skepticism of the Russian peacekeeping mission on both sides.
For Armenians, the episode has confirmed the Russians’ impotence in the face of Azerbaijani pressure. Baku has been steadily ratcheting up pressure on Yerevan to sign a comprehensive peace agreement that would restore Azerbaijan’s control over Karabakh, and their challenges to the peacekeepers have become sharper as the Russian military has gotten bogged down in Ukraine.
For Azerbaijanis, the crisis has only confirmed that the peacekeepers harbor pro-Armenian sympathies. Azerbaijani officials and media have long accused the peacekeepers of having comradely relations with the de facto government in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Baku regards as an illegitimate separatist entity.
The peacekeeping presence dates from November 2020, when the Russia-brokered agreement that ended the Second Karabakh War stipulated the deployment of 2,000 Russian soldiers to monitor the ceasefire. The peacekeepers were also to “control” and “protect” the Lachin Corridor, the only road in and out of the Armenian-populated territory.
Beyond that, though, there was no detailed mandate for their presence and little agreement on what the peacekeepers were supposed to do. In the initial stages of the post-war period, that was largely a theoretical problem. The Russians patrolled the territory, helped clear land mines and assisted locals in a variety of small humanitarian missions.
“So far, no party to the conflict has pushed back on the broad range of activities taken on by Russian peacekeepers,” the International Crisis Group wrote in a November 2021 report. “However, experience from other conflict zones suggests this could quickly become an issue in the event of an escalation in tensions: in that scenario any disparity between the two sides’ visions of Russia’s role will come sharply into view.”
In the current crisis, that warning has been proven prescient.
Since December 12, a group of Azerbaijani government-sponsored activists have effectively closed off the Lachin Corridor, holding a non-stop protest demanding that Azerbaijani officials get free access to mines that they claim Armenians have been illegally exploiting. The standoff has virtually marooned the Armenians of Karabakh, who have begun to ration food and fuel as the protesters appear ready for the long haul.
Azerbaijanis argue that nothing in the 2020 ceasefire agreement gives the Russians the right to prevent them from entering Nagorno-Karabakh, which is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory. And yet, the peacekeepers have refused to accede to the Azerbaijanis’ demands to be allowed into the territory.
A video report on the protests by the news site Caliber.az, which is connected to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense, enumerates the modest, vague list of responsibilities given to the peacekeepers, contrasting it to a number of episodes in which Russian peacekeepers interfered with Azerbaijani journalists’ coverage of the protests, including hitting a media car with a rifle butt and tearing down a tent. On other occasions Russian peacekeepers have knocked microphones out of reporters’ hands or shone spotlights into the lenses of TV cameras. “What gives you the right?” the narrator asks.
As international condemnation of the blockade has grown, Azerbaijan has sought to shift the blame on to the Russians.
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry has argued that it is not their side, but the Russian peacekeepers who have blocked the road. (The Russians have, indeed, blocked traffic from getting close to the scene of the protests in an apparent attempt to stop clashes.) Azerbaijanis at the protests say they are willing to let Armenians through, but that the Russians and the de facto Karabakh leadership are preventing it.
Armenians, meanwhile, have accused the peacekeepers of neglecting the spirit of their mission, which is to ensure the security of the ethnic Armenian population in Karabakh.
“Azerbaijan is more and more testing the red lines, checking for the Russian peacekeepers’ weaknesses and is trying to see how far this kind of pressure can go,” analyst Alexander Iskandaryan told the news site CivilNet. “The only limit on Azerbaijan is the Russian reaction, which Azerbaijan is constantly testing, and it sees that there has not been any kind of reaction that could stop this. So that’s why this is happening.”
The peacekeepers “have been on duty there for over two years already and in a way should know their tasks,” said Olesya Vartanyan, an analyst at the International Crisis Group and one of the authors of the 2021 report.
“They are doing now what they have been doing since they got deployed to the region,” Vartanyan told Eurasianet. “The issue now is that they are in the center of a crisis with people from different sides eager to criticize them: Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh might expect the peacekeepers to remove people who are blocking the road; protestors might attach different hopes to the mission.”
There are complaints not just about the peacekeepers’ passivity on the ground but the relative silence from political leaders in Moscow. While several foreign governments called on Azerbaijan to lift the blockade, four days into the crisis Russia had yet to follow suit.
“At the moment the United States, European Union, France have already issued statements, and according to our information Russia is also preparing a similar statement, which the Armenian people have been waiting for for a long time,” speaker of parliament Alen Simonyan said on December 14. “We hope that this time our partners will not disappoint us.”
On December 15 Moscow did finally address the issue. While it stopped short of blaming Azerbaijan for the blockade, it did hit back at criticism of the peacekeeping mission.
“It is unacceptable to create problems for the lives of the civilian population,” Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, said in a statement, adding: “Accusations against the peacekeepers are unacceptable and counterproductive, the Russian peacekeeping mission is effectively carrying out its duties acting as the guarantor of stability in the region.”
Indeed, it may be that the crisis has only strengthened the case for the peacekeepers’ presence.
“The key here is that without the peacekeepers it could be even worse. They are still in a way helping to sustain this shaky stability on the ground,” Vartanyan said. “The mission finds itself in a difficult situation, because, with the current crisis in Ukraine, it is not easy for those in the West to support the Russian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. This has been a very isolated mission, that has almost no contacts with international organizations, not to mention foreign governments,” she said.
Challenging the peacekeepers may turn out to backfire for Baku.
“If Baku engages in good faith with local Armenians, this would reduce the risk of potential spoilers of a peace agreement,” Zaur Shiriyev, another analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Eurasianet. “Each new escalation, either military or non-military, aggravates the fresh wounds from the 2020 war. This diminishes hopes for a sustainable peace at the societal level and strengthens radical elements in both societies.”
In that context, Shiriyev said, the blockade “is a very unproductive move. It strengthens the Armenians’ argument that Baku will not provide security and safety if they were integrated into Azerbaijan.”