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The Gusinsky’s Revenge, Part 2: The Deus ex machina


Selected Posts: Gusinsky, Lesin, and the FBI: The Goose and his Revenge: The Investigation in tweets 

November 15, 2025

The Gusinsky’s Revenge

Part 2   |   Part 1

The Investigation in tweets

 

The Deus ex machina

Gusinsky and Lesin – GS

Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Lesin were two influential Russian media figures involved in the post-Soviet media landscape. Gusinsky, a prominent media mogul and founder of the NTV television network, had a contentious relationship with the Kremlin and ultimately fled Russia. Lesin, a former press minister and media advisor to the Kremlin, was instrumental in shaping the state-controlled media and played a key role in developing the industry. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]

 

Here’s a breakdown of their roles and interactions:

 

Vladimir Gusinsky: [1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
  • Media Mogul: Gusinsky was a highly successful businessman who founded NTV, the first major independent television network in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  • Controversial Figure:His media outlets were critical of the government, leading to ongoing conflict with the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin.
  • Fled Russia: After facing criminal charges and pressure from the government, Gusinsky was forced to flee Russia in 2000.
  • Later Life: He continued to be involved in media, though his influence in Russia diminished.
Mikhail Lesin: [1, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]
  • Government Official and Advisor:Lesin served as Russia’s Minister of Press, Television, and Radio, and later as an advisor to President Putin.
  • Shaped State Media: He played a significant role in establishing and controlling state-aligned media, often working to consolidate power and promote the Kremlin’s agenda.
  • Controversial Figure: Like Gusinsky, Lesin was a complex and controversial figure, with critics accusing him of suppressing media freedom.
  • Mysterious Death: Lesin died in 2015 under circumstances that remain debated, with some sources attributing his death to natural causes and others suggesting foul play.
Key Interaction: [1, 25]
  • Gusinsky and Lesin’s paths crossed when Lesin was in a position of power within the government and Gusinsky was a target. Lesin was instrumental in the crackdown on independent media, including NTV, and ultimately contributed to the decline of Gusinsky’s media empire.
In essence, Gusinsky represented the struggle for independent media in Russia, while Lesin represented the state’s efforts to control the narrative. [1, 26, 27, 28]



AI responses may include mistakes.


Categories
Featured Posts The News And Times Blog

AI Review: How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies? How will the Trump’s cuts affect the CIA?


How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies? How will the Trump’s cuts affect the CIA? “In conclusion, while a simple “efficiency score” for an intelligence agency is unrealistic, a comprehensive and thoughtful evaluation framework that considers outcomes, processes, and perceptions, while acknowledging the inherent challenges, can provide valuable insights into how effectively these vital organizations are operating and where improvements can be made.”

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How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies?

Gemini 

Measuring the efficiency of intelligence agencies is a complex endeavor, fraught with unique challenges not typically encountered when evaluating other government organizations or private sector entities. Due to the clandestine nature of their work, the sensitivity of their information, and the long-term and often indirect impact of their efforts, traditional metrics of efficiency, such as cost-benefit analyses or direct output measurements, often fall short.

However, a more nuanced approach can be taken by considering a range of factors and indicators, both qualitative and quantitative:

1. Outcome-Based Measures (Effectiveness leading to Efficiency):

  • Prevention of Threats: Arguably the most critical measure. How effective is the agency in preventing terrorist attacks, cyber intrusions, espionage, and other threats to national security? This is difficult to quantify directly but can be assessed through:
    • Number of disrupted plots or attacks: While a significant indicator, it doesn’t capture the full scope of deterrence.
    • Reduced impact of successful attacks: Were the consequences mitigated due to timely warnings or intelligence-led responses?
    • Expert assessments and after-action reviews: Qualitative analyses of how intelligence contributed to averting or minimizing harm.
  • Strategic Warning: How timely and accurate is the intelligence provided to policymakers regarding emerging threats and crises?
    • Accuracy of forecasts and assessments: Evaluating historical intelligence products against actual events.
    • Timeliness of dissemination: Was the information available when needed for decision-making?
    • Impact on policy decisions: Did the intelligence inform and improve the quality of national security strategies?
  • Support to Operations: How effectively does intelligence support military, law enforcement, and diplomatic efforts?
    • Actionable intelligence provided: Did the intelligence lead to successful operations or outcomes?
    • Relevance and accuracy of targeting data: In military contexts, this is a critical measure.
    • Situational awareness enhancement: Did intelligence improve the understanding of the operational environment?

2. Process-Oriented Measures (How efficiently are tasks performed?):

  • Timeliness of Production and Dissemination: How quickly is raw intelligence processed, analyzed, and delivered to the relevant consumers?
    • Mean time to produce finished intelligence products.
    • Speed of dissemination through appropriate channels.
  • Resource Management: How efficiently are financial, human, and technological resources utilized?
    • Cost-effectiveness of collection platforms and operations.
    • Personnel productivity and workload management.
    • Minimization of redundancies and overlaps within and between agencies.
  • Information Management: How effectively is intelligence data stored, retrieved, and shared (appropriately)?
    • Efficiency of data processing and analysis tools.
    • Accessibility of relevant information to authorized users.
    • Security and integrity of data holdings.
  • Accuracy and Reliability: What is the track record of the agency in producing accurate and reliable intelligence?
    • Low rate of errors or retractions.
    • High confidence levels in assessments, clearly communicated.
    • Effective validation and vetting processes for sources and information.

3. Trust and Perception-Based Measures:

  • Public Trust and Confidence: While difficult to directly link to efficiency, public trust can impact an agency’s legitimacy and effectiveness in the long run.
    • Surveys of public opinion (though these can be influenced by many factors).
    • Media coverage and public discourse surrounding the agency.
  • Customer Satisfaction: Feedback from policymakers, military commanders, and other intelligence consumers regarding the utility and quality of intelligence products and services.
    • Formal feedback mechanisms and surveys.
    • Informal communication and engagement.
  • Adherence to Legal and Ethical Standards: Efficient intelligence gathering should not come at the expense of legality and ethics.
    • Number of legal challenges or violations.
    • Oversight body reports and findings.
    • Internal compliance mechanisms and audits.

Challenges in Measuring Efficiency:

  • Secrecy and Classification: The very nature of intelligence work limits transparency and the ability to use open-source data for evaluation.
  • Long-Term Impact: The benefits of intelligence work, such as preventing a future attack, are often intangible and difficult to attribute directly.
  • Complexity of Threats: The evolving nature of threats requires constant adaptation, making it hard to establish consistent benchmarks.
  • Attribution Issues: It can be challenging to definitively prove that an intelligence action directly led to a specific outcome.
  • Politicization: Intelligence assessments can sometimes be influenced by political considerations, complicating objective evaluation.
  • Lack of Standardized Metrics: There is no universally agreed-upon framework for measuring intelligence efficiency across different agencies and countries.

Moving Forward:

Measuring intelligence agency efficiency requires a multi-faceted approach that combines quantitative data where possible with qualitative assessments and expert judgment. Emphasis should be placed on:

  • Developing clear objectives and priorities: This provides a basis for evaluating whether the agency is achieving its intended goals.
  • Establishing robust oversight mechanisms: Independent bodies can provide objective evaluations and identify areas for improvement.
  • Promoting a culture of evaluation: Encouraging internal assessments and lessons learned.
  • Investing in data analytics and technology: To better track processes and outcomes while respecting security constraints.
  • Fostering dialogue between intelligence professionals, policymakers, and oversight bodies: To develop more effective and relevant measures of efficiency.

In conclusion, while a simple “efficiency score” for an intelligence agency is unrealistic, a comprehensive and thoughtful evaluation framework that considers outcomes, processes, and perceptions, while acknowledging the inherent challenges, can provide valuable insights into how effectively these vital organizations are operating and where improvements can be made.

https://g.co/gemini/share/68a03c21bfc6

Intelligence and Counterintelligence – AI Review

https://www.google.com/collections/s/list/nxTRV_7dRICjjI8L5Iuw3A/If3OWsa6Qb8

Measuring the efficiency of intelligence agency AI systems requires a multi-faceted approach, encompassing quantitative performance metrics, qualitative assessments, and ethical considerations. Key areas to focus on include system performance and outcomes, risk management, ethical implications, social impact, and organizational readiness and adoption. [1, 2]
Key Metrics and Considerations: [3, 3]
  • System Performance and Outcomes: [3, 3]
    • Accuracy: How often the AI system’s predictions match actual outcomes. [3, 3]
    • Speed and Latency: How quickly the AI system can process information and generate results. [4, 4]
    • Efficiency and Scalability: How efficiently the AI system utilizes resources (time, space, energy) and how well it handles increasing workloads. [5, 5, 6, 7]
    • Task Completion Time: How long it takes for the AI to complete assigned tasks. [8, 8]
    • User Satisfaction: How effectively the AI system assists users in their work. [9, 9]
    • Uptime and Error Rate: How consistently the AI system is available and how often it produces errors. [10, 10]
  • Risk Management: [11, 11]
    • Data Privacy and Security: How well the AI system protects sensitive data and prevents unauthorized access. [11, 11, 12, 13, 14]
    • Compliance: Adherence to relevant regulations and ethical guidelines. [1, 1, 15, 16]
  • Ethical Implications: [11, 11, 17, 17]
    • Bias Detection and Mitigation: Identifying and addressing any biases in the AI system’s training data and algorithms. [11, 11, 17, 17, 18]
    • Explainability and Interpretability: Understanding how the AI system arrives at its conclusions and ensuring transparency. [11, 11, 19, 20, 21]
  • Social Impact: [11, 11]
    • Impact on Human Workforce: Assessing how the AI system affects the roles and responsibilities of intelligence personnel. [11, 11, 22]
    • Bias in Algorithms: Ensuring that AI systems do not perpetuate or amplify existing societal biases. [11, 11, 23]
  • Organizational Readiness and Adoption: [1, 1]
    • Training and Support: Providing adequate training and support for personnel to effectively use the AI system. [1, 1, 24, 25]
    • Organizational Culture: Ensuring that the organization is receptive to and able to integrate AI into its workflow. [1, 1, 26, 27]
Beyond the Metrics: [11, 11]
  • Human Oversight: Maintaining human oversight of the AI system to ensure accuracy, fairness, and accountability. [11, 11, 28, 29, 30, 31]
  • Continuous Monitoring and Improvement: Regularly evaluating the AI system’s performance and making adjustments as needed. [1, 1, 32]
  • Collaboration and Knowledge Sharing: Fostering collaboration between intelligence agencies, researchers, and policymakers to develop best practices for using AI in intelligence. [11, 11, 33, 34]
Generative AI is experimental.
AI Review: How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies?
Measuring the efficiency of intelligence agencies is a complex endeavor, as their work often involves secrecy and long-term impacts that are difficult to quantify

. 

Here’s a breakdown of how one might approach measuring their efficiency, with a focus on challenges and potential metrics:
Challenges:
  • Secrecy and Sensitivity: Many operations and results are classified, making public or independent assessment difficult.
  • Attribution and Causality: It can be challenging to directly link specific intelligence activities to positive outcomes or to determine if a particular event would have unfolded differently without the agency’s involvement.
  • Defining Success: What constitutes “success” for an intelligence agency can be multifaceted and subjective, ranging from preventing terrorist attacks to informing policy decisions.
  • Long-Term Impacts: The impact of intelligence work may not be immediately apparent and can unfold over years or decades. 
Potential Metrics & Evaluation Areas:
  • Timeliness and Accuracy of Intelligence:
    • How quickly and reliably does the agency deliver actionable intelligence to decision-makers?
    • How accurate are the agency’s predictions and assessments of threats and opportunities?
  • Effectiveness in Achieving Objectives:
    • Has the agency successfully disrupted terrorist plots, countered foreign espionage, or supported military operations?
    • How effectively does the agency contribute to achieving national security goals as defined in strategic documents like the National Security Strategy?
  • Efficiency of Operations and Resource Utilization:
    • How cost-effective are the agency’s intelligence gathering methods and analysis processes?
    • Are there areas where duplication or inefficiency can be addressed?
  • Responsiveness to Policy Needs:
    • How effectively does the agency anticipate and respond to the evolving intelligence needs of policymakers?
    • Is the agency’s intelligence product tailored to the specific requirements of different customers (e.g., policymakers, military leaders)?
  • Adaptability and Innovation:
    • How effectively does the agency adapt to emerging threats and technological advancements (e.g., AI, cyber)?
    • Does the agency foster a culture of innovation and continuous improvement in its methods and technologies?
  • Compliance and Oversight:
    • Does the agency operate within the bounds of the law and respect civil liberties?
    • How effectively are oversight mechanisms (e.g., legislative committees, inspectors general) functioning? 
Methods for Evaluation:
  • Independent Reviews: Commissions or panels of experts could conduct periodic reviews, accessing classified information and interviewing agency personnel.
  • Performance Audits: Inspectors General within the agencies or parent organizations can assess operational efficiency and compliance.
  • Feedback Mechanisms: Soliciting feedback from policymakers and other users of intelligence products can provide insights into the agency’s effectiveness and responsiveness.
  • Comparative Analysis: Benchmarking the performance of intelligence agencies against those of other countries (where possible) can offer insights into best practices and areas for improvement. 
Important Considerations:
  • Balancing Security and Transparency: Any evaluation framework must carefully balance the need for accountability and transparency with the need to protect sensitive information and sources.
  • Avoiding Unrealistic Expectations: Intelligence agencies operate in a complex and uncertain environment, and not all threats can be anticipated or prevented.
  • Qualitative Insights: Metrics should be complemented by qualitative assessments that consider the broader context and the agency’s contribution to national security. 
AI Mode is experimental and can make mistakes. Learn more

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OSINT

SkyWatchJP: 📡 スカイウォッチJP 定時観測 2026-08-17 09:54 JST ✈️ 現在追跡: 300機 🪖 軍用機疑い(24h): 0機 🆘 緊急事態(24h): 14件 状況: 🆘 緊急事態あり #スカイウォッチJP #OSINT #航空監視


📡 スカイウォッチJP 定時観測
2026-08-17 09:54 JST

✈️ 現在追跡: 300機
🪖 軍用機疑い(24h): 0機
🆘 緊急事態(24h): 14件

状況: 🆘 緊急事態あり

#スカイウォッチJP  #OSINT  #航空監視


Categories
Security and Intelligence

A U.S. Marine assigned to Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, Company B, Marine Corps Information Command, operates a first-person view drone aboard a UH-1Y Venom during Technology Operational Experimentation Event 26.1 near Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, on August 10, 2026.


A U.S. Marine assigned to Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, Company B, Marine Corps Information Command, operates a first-person view drone aboard a UH-1Y Venom during Technology Operational Experimentation Event 26.1 near Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, on August 10, 2026.

Categories
OSINT

A U.S. Marine assigned to Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, Company B, Marine Corps Information Command, operates a first-person view drone aboard a UH-1Y Venom during Technology Operational Experimentation Event 26.1 near Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, on August 10, 2026.


A U.S. Marine assigned to Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, Company B, Marine Corps Information Command, operates a first-person view drone aboard a UH-1Y Venom during Technology Operational Experimentation Event 26.1 near Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, on August 10, 2026.

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Security and Intelligence

New in SpyWeek: That CIA Mystery Plane, the Iran Threat to Kill Trump, Israeli and Russian Intrigue, and More


Trump slipped away from Air Force One in a catering container. Did an Israeli intelligence report cause panic? (CBS).

Israeli Plane Trick? It was a report from Israeli intelligence that prompted the Secret Service to persuade President Trump to ditch his tricked out Qatari-gifted 747 for the regular Air Force One and then secretly abandon that for yet another jet in Turkey, leaving Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, other White House staffers and the press corps to fly home on what became a decoy plane. But as it turned out, the CIA had “low confidence’ in the Iranian threat before Trump switched planes in Turkey, according to The Washington Post, which quoted a source saying that the warning fitted “a broader pattern of Israeli intelligence reporting that some officials see as designed as much to shape presidential decision-making as to inform it.”

Trump’s IRGC Back Channel: Since U.S. and Israeli warplanes targeted Iran’s civilian leadership for assassination in the opening days of the now six-month long war, the Trump administration has struggled to find somebody to talk to in Tehran. So they looked around and settled on Nechirvan Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan region in Iraq, “who had something very few others do: the trust of both U.S. and IRGC leaders,” reports Trump telegrapher Barak Ravid in Axios.

Disinfo on Iran Nuclear? An anonymous post on X in India in early August claiming Iran had gone nuclear and quoting its IRGC commander saying “his country would never give up its nuclear weapon ambitions as long as Israel and the United States possessed those weapons,” got traction in Washington—no matter that it was palpably untrue, reported the New York Times on Sunday.


Read more


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Espionage And Transnational Repression in the US

Trump says US to scale back military drills with South Korea after it stayed out of Iran war – BBC


  1. Trump says US to scale back military drills with South Korea after it stayed out of Iran war  BBC
  2. Trump orders major cut to US-South Korea drills as North Korea ramps up missile tests  Fox News
  3. Trump says US to ‘substantially reduce’ military drills with South Korea  Al Jazeera
  4. Trump says US will reduce military exercises with South Korea, citing lack of help with Iran  CNN
  5. Trump orders Pentagon to scale back joint exercises with South Korea  AP News

Categories
Espionage And Transnational Repression in the US

Trump orders Pentagon to scale back joint exercises with South Korea – apnews.com


  1. Trump orders Pentagon to scale back joint exercises with South Korea  apnews.com
  2. Trump says US will reduce military exercises with South Korea, citing lack of help with Iran  CNN
  3. Trump orders to scale back US-South Korea military drills  dw.com
  4. Trump tells Hegseth to cut back U.S.-South Korea drills  Axios
  5. Trump Says He’s Curtailing Military Drills With South Korea  Bloomberg.com

Categories
Security and Intelligence

Another slight to another ally. Why? Could be any number of reasons. It matters why. But the pattern of harming alliances is a key feature of Trump 2.0 foreign policy, regardless of the specific reasons for each offense.


Another slight to another ally. Why? Could be any number of reasons. It matters why. But the pattern of harming alliances is a key feature of Trump 2.0 foreign policy, regardless of the specific reasons for each offense.The Spectator Index (@spectatorindex)BREAKING: Trump orders Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to reduce US-South Korea joint military exercises, saying they are ‘inappropriate and hostile’ to North Korea, adding he has a ‘very good relationship with Kim Jong Un’.—  https://x.com/spectatorindex/status/2089099916710920236

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Security and Intelligence

MORE: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse on August 15-16, meaning Ukrainian forces have now struck and stopped operations at seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukraine’s August 15-16 overnight strikes hit Wildberries’ largest logistics hub (with an area of 250,000 square meters) in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border). The Wildberries Press Service confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the facility and forced the company to reorganize its logistics chains. Moscow Oblast Gover


MORE: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse on August 15-16, meaning Ukrainian forces have now struck and stopped operations at seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers.

The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukraine’s August 15-16 overnight strikes hit Wildberries’ largest logistics hub (with an area of 250,000 square meters) in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border). The Wildberries Press Service confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the facility and forced the company to reorganize its logistics chains. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov also acknowledged the strike on the Podolsk Wildberries facility. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking the warehouse in Koledino, causing a fire.

The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a warehouse in Domodedovo, Moscow Oblast (roughly 430 kilometers from the international border), on the night of August 15 to 16. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows a fire at the Severnoye Domodedovo logistics complex. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov acknowledged the Ukrainian strike on Domodedovo.

Ukrainian officials have noted that Ukrainian forces are striking Wildberries warehouses as the company is involved in supplying the Russian military, including with drone components and navigation equipment. Reuters reported in early August 2026 that Ukrainian strikes had destroyed at least 1.18 million square meters of Wildberries’ warehouse space, representing one-fifth of Wildberries’ total warehouse capacity at that time, and the impact of the Ukrainian strike campaign on the company has only grown since.

ISW continues to assess that a Ukrainian strike campaign against Wildberries logistics centers is putting additional pressure on Russia’s economy and already-overstretched air defenses.

Russia’s inability to protect Wildberries’ largest logistics hubs despite the ongoing Ukrainian campaign against such targets demonstrates how Russia lacks a sufficient number of air defenses to protect all of the necessary infrastructure in its rear.Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)NEW: Ukrainian forces have struck seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers since July 2026 as part of the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign aimed at degrading the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and dual-use logistics network.

Other Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial facility in Rostov Oblast on the night of August 15 to 16.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 16.

Russia launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles, Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 106 drones against Ukraine overnight.—  https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2089122576660349279


Categories
Security and Intelligence

MORE: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse on August 15-16, meaning Ukrainian forces have now struck and stopped operations at seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukraine’s August 15-16 overnight strikes hit Wildberries’ largest logistics hub (with an area of 250,000 square meters) in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border). The Wildberries Press Service confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the facility and forced the company to reorganize its logistics chains. Moscow Oblast Gover


MORE: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse on August 15-16, meaning Ukrainian forces have now struck and stopped operations at seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers.

The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukraine’s August 15-16 overnight strikes hit Wildberries’ largest logistics hub (with an area of 250,000 square meters) in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border). The Wildberries Press Service confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the facility and forced the company to reorganize its logistics chains. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov also acknowledged the strike on the Podolsk Wildberries facility. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking the warehouse in Koledino, causing a fire.

The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a warehouse in Domodedovo, Moscow Oblast (roughly 430 kilometers from the international border), on the night of August 15 to 16. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows a fire at the Severnoye Domodedovo logistics complex. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov acknowledged the Ukrainian strike on Domodedovo.

Ukrainian officials have noted that Ukrainian forces are striking Wildberries warehouses as the company is involved in supplying the Russian military, including with drone components and navigation equipment. Reuters reported in early August 2026 that Ukrainian strikes had destroyed at least 1.18 million square meters of Wildberries’ warehouse space, representing one-fifth of Wildberries’ total warehouse capacity at that time, and the impact of the Ukrainian strike campaign on the company has only grown since.

ISW continues to assess that a Ukrainian strike campaign against Wildberries logistics centers is putting additional pressure on Russia’s economy and already-overstretched air defenses.

Russia’s inability to protect Wildberries’ largest logistics hubs despite the ongoing Ukrainian campaign against such targets demonstrates how Russia lacks a sufficient number of air defenses to protect all of the necessary infrastructure in its rear.Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)NEW: Ukrainian forces have struck seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers since July 2026 as part of the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign aimed at degrading the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and dual-use logistics network.

Other Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial facility in Rostov Oblast on the night of August 15 to 16.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 16.

Russia launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles, Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 106 drones against Ukraine overnight.—  https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2089122576660349279


Categories
OSINT

OSINT Intuit™: Tonight’s delicious Ukrainian drone strike package appears to include Moscow again! Returning to the rotation of previously targeted areas is Astrakhan, with Russian spotters reporting drone activity approaching the region via Volgograd. The Astrakhan seaport, a major hub for


Tonight’s delicious Ukrainian drone strike package appears to include Moscow again!

Returning to the rotation of previously targeted areas is Astrakhan, with Russian spotters reporting drone activity approaching the region via Volgograd. The Astrakhan seaport, a major hub for