Day: September 26, 2023

Source: Al Jazeera

The events of the last week are triggering a debate on the need for a deep reset of Europe’s policy toward Azerbaijan.

It’s all about Karabakh, but it’s even bigger than that.

On September 19, Azerbaijan used military force to retake the Armenian-populated territory of Nagorny Karabakh, crossing a red line drawn for it by both the European Union and the United States.

The consequences are cataclysmic. The eventual casualties will run into the hundreds. Fearful for their future, thousands of Karabakh Armenians are now making a mass tragic exodus from their homeland to Armenia.

Many in Brussels and Washington feel shocked and betrayed by Azerbaijan’s use of force. Up until the last minute, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was reportedly assuring high-level interlocutors—including European Council President Charles Michel and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken—that he would not launch a military operation.

At the United Nations, German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, said it most clearly: “Baku broke its repeated assurances to refrain from the use of force, causing tremendous suffering to a population already in dire straits.”

An egregious aspect of this is that Azerbaijan was getting pretty much everything it wanted at the negotiating table. After years of deadlock and many equivocations, the Karabakh Armenians had agreed to talks with Baku, which would have resulted in a deal on some kind of integration into Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had acceded to the international norm in acknowledging Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including Nagorny Karabakh.

So it can’t be business as normal. The human rights issue is now crucial. Baku says that it is in full control of the region and that remaining Armenians have nothing to fear. Yet that is not how bitterly contested ethnic conflicts are fought, when armed groups are sent into civilian areas. There many reports of abuses by Azerbaijani soldiers coming from Armenian sources.

Having thus far rejected efforts to send in an international monitoring mission to the region, Baku bears a great responsibility here. It is not so easy to hide war crimes in the digital age. If atrocities are confirmed in Baku’s war of choice or remaining Karabakhis suffer abuse, there should be calls for prosecution of the abusers concerned, along with cases in the European Court of Human Rights.

The geopolitical implications of this are also significant.

The fact that Western actors were blindsided strengthens the supposition that Aliyev cleared his military assault in advance with Moscow—which then failed to condemn Baku—and is coming into closer alignment with Russia. That is all the more relevant as the next big issue is the planned transport route across Armenia to Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan. Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey all have a shared interest in imposing their own version of what the latter two call the Zangezur Corridor with as little Armenian control of the route as possible—and perhaps by force.

Aliyev has also started to use the irredentist term “Western Azerbaijan” to describe southern Armenia, also known as Zangezur, which had a substantial Azerbaijani population in the early twentieth century. Last December he designated the creation of a “West Azerbaijani community” and said “they must be able to return to their native lands.”

Aliyev qualified that this return would happen “peacefully.” But after what happened in Karabakh, how seriously can reassurance be taken?

There is a context, of course, that Azerbaijan has been a victim too. Azerbaijanis have compelling stories to tell about the 1990s that many do not know—and which I tried to tell in my book Black Garden. In the first Karabakh war, both sides committed acts of ethnic cleansing, but Azerbaijan undoubtedly came off worse. Hundreds of thousands of displaced people driven from lands captured by Armenian forces deserved sympathy—probably more sympathy than they often got internationally.

That’s a reason to avoid the civilizational discourse that still lingers in some European circles, especially in France and on the Christian right, who say Azerbaijanis are somehow inherently genocidal.

But after the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan recovered its lands by force, the “occupation” excuse lost its relevance. When statesmanship was called for, President Aliyev stayed aggressive. In May this year he gave a bellicose speech in which he told the Armenians that they should either “bend their necks” in defeat or face worse consequences.

Aggression continues on the home front, too. Azerbaijan’s democracy ranking with Freedom House is rock-bottom. In July the well-known economist and opposition activist Gubad Ibadoghlu, linked to U.S. universities and the London School of Economics, was arrested on palpably bogus charges and is now in ill health in detention.

Baku’s main sales pitch in the West is about business and geography—its status as the only country located between Russia and Iran with east-west oil and gas and transport infrastructure as a link in the so-called Middle Corridor.

In Western capitals this frequently produced a silo effect. One part of the establishment—in the Brussels case, Michel and the European External Action Service—would press for peacemaking and resolution of the conflict with Armenia. Another—the European Commission in Brussels—would hold talks with Baku on energy and transport projects.

In an ill-conceived act of public diplomacy in July 2022, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen went to Baku, struck a deal with the EU’s “partner” Azerbaijan to provide extra volumes of gas to the EU, and did not even mention the words “conflict,” “peace,” or “Armenia” in public.

Azerbaijan will always be a transport hub, but there are two caveats to the pitch. First, experts conclude that the EU gas deal is very unlikely to deliver the promised high volumes of gas—a declining asset in the green transition anyway. To achieve export levels of more than 3 or 4 billion cubic meters would require upgrading infrastructure and confronting the often-overlooked fact that Russia and Iran are also stakeholders in the South Caucasus gas pipeline.

Secondly, connectivity and conflict are inextricably linked. The Middle Corridor route, running from China through Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, is a multi-country route that also involves Armenia. It needs regional cooperation to work—and almost certainly funding from Western governments and international financial institutions.

In short, it is time for the EU to talk a lot tougher with Azerbaijan.

In late September Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote an article Nagorno-Karabakh: A Year of U.S. Failure in the South Caucasus.

Michael Rubin worked previously at the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense where he was staff adviser for Iran and Iraq (2002–04) and served as Political Adviser for Coalition Provisional Authority at Baghdad (2003–04).

Mediamax talked to Michael Rubin.

Most likely, U.S. intelligence was aware of the intention of Azerbaijan and Turkey to start a war in September 2020. Did the American side have real opportunities to prevent this war?

The Congress has never confirmed whether U.S. intelligence was aware of Azerbaijan and Turkey’s intention to start a war. I think it more likely there was an intelligence failure rather than a deliberate decision to ignore a pending attack. If the American side did have foreknowledge, however, simply exposing it in advance might have prevented the attack. After all, Turkey and Azerbaijan launched a surprise attack; had Armenia and Artsakh been aware of it beforehand, they could have taken steps to pre-empt or blunt the attack.

What could the United States do after the war broke up to stop it as soon as possible but did not do it?

Drones were decisive in the war. The United States might have helped with counter-drone technology but, realistically, Armenia’s defense relationship with Russia precludes the sharing of such sensitive technology. Certainly, the United States could have sanctioned Turkey and Azerbaijan. This would be slower sanctions do work: Erdogan is full of bluster but, when Trump imposed sanctions, he released Pastor Andrew Brunson, an American hostage Erdogan has seized.

For decades, representatives of the United States and Russia were saying that despite the differences over many issues of international politics, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship was the format in which they really cooperate effectively. How sincere were these assurances?

Obviously, Washington was more sincere than Moscow, since Russia unilaterally abrogated its agreements. That said, while the Minsk Group was founded with good intentions and there had been some progress in recent years, it was not a major focus of US policy. While Russia and France appointed ambassadors as its co-chairs, the United States appointed a lesser-ranked diplomat.

Does the format of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship continue to be a capable instrument, or does it rather work by inertia and sooner or later will lose its significance?

I’d say its significance was lost last year.

There are forces in Yerevan which believe that despite the increased dependence on Russia, Armenia should make efforts to build relations with the United States. But does the American side have an intention to strengthen relations with Armenia? What can Armenia’s attraction be?

There is no reason why Armenia can’t have good relations with both the United States and Russia, much like Kazakhstan and Egypt do. While many in the US are suspicious of Armenia’s ties to Russia and Iran, Armenia should respond by pointing out that these are of necessity given the Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade. There is no reason why the United States should not pressure for the lifting of the illegal Turkish and Azeri blockade of Armenia. Armenia also can make its diaspora ties to the UK, Iran, and Russia and asset and market itself as a hub for diplomacy.

You conclude your article with a call to impose sanctions against Ilham Aliyev’s regime. But why impose sanctions against a president who, apparently, suits everyone: Russia, the United States and the Europeans, who today, more than ever, need alternative energy suppliers?

Remember, the US doesn’t get its energy from the Middle East let alone Azerbaijan; we get ours from Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, or Brazil. Azerbaijan is not as important as it thinks it is, especially with the development of Eastern Mediterranean fields. The problem really is not economic, though: it’s that Aliyev is turning into Saddam Hussein. British Petroleum and London can have their own policy, but the US should see the warning signs and pull back from its ties before he sets off a cascade of events which would destabilize the entire region.

Thousands more Armenian refugees fled Nagorno-Karabakh on Tuesday (26 September) as officials in Azerbaijan’s war-scarred separatist statelet raised the death toll from a fuel blast to 20. Nearly 300 are injured, some severely burned.

The number of deaths from Monday’s disaster threatened to grow much higher because dozens were being treated in critical condition and many remained unaccounted for.

Most of the victims were stocking up on fuel for the trip down the so-called Lachin Corridor connecting the impoverished and historically disputed region with Armenia.

Yerevan has warned of possible “ethnic cleansing” by Azerbaijan — a close ally of Armenia’s arch-nemesis Turkey — after Baku claimed full control of the region in a lightning offensive last week.

Armenians, mostly Christian, and Azerbaijanis, mostly Muslim, have fought two wars over the mountainous territory since the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse that has claimed tens of thousands of lives.

The area is now populated by up to 120,000 ethnic Armenians but is internationally recognised as part Azerbaijan.

Armenia said on Tuesday that more than 13,000 refugees had fled since the first group arrived in the country on Sunday.

An AFP team along the Lachin Corridor saw hundreds of cars piled high with belongings moving slowly along the jam-packed road.

Some of the vehicles crept along on flat tyres and many people simply walked past the last Azerbaijani checkpoint.

“They expelled us,” one man said as he walked past the Azerbaijani soldiers.

The influx overwhelmed the border town of Goris — the first port of call for most families.

“We lived through terrible days,” said Anabel Ghulasyan, 41, from the village of Rev, known as Shalva in Azeri.

Many slept in their cars, emerging on Tuesday with red-rimmed eyes and forming long queues outside shops to buy phone cards.

Fears of higher toll

Adding to the humanitarian drama, the separatist government on Tuesday said 13 bodies were found at the scene of a fuel depot blast on Monday and seven more people had died of their injuries.

It said 290 people had been hospitalised and “dozens of patients remain in critical condition”.

Armenia’s health ministry said it had sent a team of doctors to the rebel stronghold of Stepanakert by helicopter.

The Azerbaijani presidency said Baku had also sent medicine to help the wounded.

But treatment was being complicated because local hospitals had run low on medications after a nine-month blockade Azerbaijan had imposed to bring the region to heel.

Azerbaijan turned on the electricity of the rebel stronghold Stepanakert on Sunday, switching it to its own power grid as part of a “reintegration” drive.

Envoys from Baku and Yerevan were in Brussels on Tuesday to pave the way for the first meeting between their leaders since last week’s offensive on October 5.

Tuesday’s talks between national security advisers of the two countries and European heavyweights Germany and France will be chaired by the chief diplomatic adviser to European Council president Charles Michel.

Chaos

Azerbaijan’s operation on 19 September to seize control of the territory forced the separatists to lay down their arms under the terms of a ceasefire agreed the following day.

The separatists have said 200 people were killed in last week’s fighting.

Azerbaijan’s state media on Monday said officials held a second round of peace talks with Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian community aimed at “reintegrating” them.

The question of staying or leaving is now tormenting many Armenian families.

Some say that they cannot live under the authority of Azerbaijanis, while others argue that leaving now means that Armenians might never be able to return, losing the region for good.

“If I do have a chance to come back, I will,” said Khachatur Aydinyan, a 62-year-old shepherd.

“I am sad to leave my sheep behind.”

Those who do decide to go often run the risk of losing contact with friends or family members waiting for them on the other side of the border in the chaotic sea of people.

“I am waiting for my sister’s family,” Artak Soghomonyan, 36, told AFP on the Armenian side of the border.

“They left Stepanakert yesterday, but I have heard nothing since because there is no cell phone service.”

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