Day: September 17, 2026
Other Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness.
Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026.
Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast.
Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages.
Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine.
The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
Russia launched 157 drones, 10 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and an unspecified number of missiles at Ukraine overnight.
毛阿敏《相思》歌词 – 百度知道
The Houthis currently possess near-exclusive control over the Red Sea coastal plain in Yemen and major islands in the southern Red Sea following a major military offensive against the Yemeni government between September 9 and 11.
The Houthis are attempting to fortify their positions along the Bab al Mandeb Strait amid reports that the Yemeni government re-established control over high ground that sits above Houthi positions near the Bab al Mandeb. Houthi efforts to reinforce their positions along the Bab al Mandeb indicate that the Houthis intend to hold and defend these positions. The Houthis constructed roughly 11 kilometers of earthen berms along their frontline positions north of al Aradi, Lahij Governorate, between September 11 and 16, according to satellite imagery on September 16.
Evidence of Houthi efforts to construct berms east of the Bab al Mandeb in recent days indicates that Saudi and Yemeni government efforts to deny the Houthis control of terrain along the strait have thus far been unsuccessful, and that the Houthis are preparing to defend and ensure their long-term control of this terrain.Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar)NEW: Allowing the Houthis to consolidate control over the Red Sea coastal plain would enable the Houthis to assert illegal authority over international maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandeb Strait, which would be extremely detrimental to US interests. The Houthis’ recent military activity in the Red Sea coastal plain indicates that the group is trying to reinforce its de facto control over the Red Sea coast in tandem with its efforts to assert illegal authority over maritime traffic. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis are using their ability to threaten international shipping to deter the United States from providing more significant support to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis. The Houthis have effectively told the United States that the group will not attack international, non-Saudi vessels if the United States refrains from supporting Saudi Arabia and confronting the Houthis. This diplomatic “understanding” is intended to deter the United States from becoming more involved in the conflict by warning that the Houthis could attack international vessels if the United States supports Saudi Arabia militarily.
The current Houthi military campaign against Saudi Arabia is malignant and imposes economic costs on the entire international community, not solely Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers, and attacks on its major oil refineries and other facilities contribute to high oil prices worldwide.
Saudi and international attempts to restrain the Houthis through mediation or contact with Iran are unlikely to succeed because the Houthis are an independent partner of Iran that pursues discrete objectives. The Houthis’ campaigns in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the Red Sea simultaneously advance both Houthi and Iranian objectives, which makes it further unlikely that Iran would try to “rein in” the Houthis.— https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2100759037054701964
