Can’t login to Connect app on my phone. Whenever I try to login on my phone, it makes me login through Microsoft and then tells me that my work email isn’t enrolled to use the app. Strangely enough I just discovered that I can login on my iPad just fine, and it lets me login through the regular Best Buy login screen.
The Biden administration is considering designating the Wagner Group, a Russian private military group, as a foreign terrorist organization amid ongoing efforts to impose costs on Russia for the Ukraine war, a US official said.
No final decision has been made, and it is unclear how far out the administration is from potentially making this designation given the laborious legal process in making this determination, the official explained.
The Wagner Group is a mercenary firm that has been heavily involved in the fighting in Ukraine. The group is often described as President Vladimir Putin’s off-the-books troops. It has expanded its footprint globally since its creation in 2014. The group has been accused of war crimes in Africa, Syria and Ukraine.
The group was founded by a Russian oligarch, Yevgeny Prigozhin, which he admitted to earlier this year. Prigozhin is so close to the Kremlin that he is known as Putin’s “chef.”
The group is already sanctioned by the US, but the Biden administration has its sights on labeling it a terrorist organization amid pressure – both from the Ukrainians and from Congress – to declare Russia as a state sponsor of terror due to the invasion of Ukraine and the constant attacks on the civilian population.
“As Ukraine continues to seize momentum on the battlefield, President Putin has focused his ire and his fire on Ukraine’s civilian population,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at a news conference Wednesday at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Bucharest, Romania, noting that Putin’s targets are heat, water and electricity. “This brutalization of Ukraine’s people is barbaric.”
The Biden administration has so far resisted efforts to label Russia as a state sponsor of terror, making the case that it would be a largely symbolic designation that could create obstacles when it comes to getting support into Ukraine, particularly through the Black Sea.
“We have to take into account the consequences, both the intended and the unintended. And that has led us to the approach we’ve taken here,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price said earlier this year.
The conversations regarding Wagner are currently happening within a small group of US officials, and no final decision has been made.
“I have no discussions to confirm on this. The United States will continue to hold those responsible for perpetrating Russia’s war against Ukraine to account,” a State Department spokesperson said when asked about the discussions.
Earlier this year, Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov told CNN that Wagner troops were being deployed in the “most difficult and important missions” in Ukraine, playing a key role in Russian victories in Mariupol and Kherson.
CNN has reported on plummeting morale in the private army as Russia’s Ukraine war falters.
Bloomberg first reported that the administration is considering the foreign terrorist organization designation for the Wagner Group.
A simple typo means millions of emails meant for the U.S. military are about to fall into the hands of Mali, a pro-Russia state in West Africa, the Financial Times reported on Monday.
The so-called “typo leak” is the result of people misspelling the suffix used at the end of all U.S. military email addresses: While the military uses .MIL, the country identifier for Mali is .ML.
For the 10 years ending on Monday, .ML was managed by Dutch entrepreneur Johannes Zuurbier, who was contracted to look after the domain after taking on similar contracts in Tokelau, the Central African Republic, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.
However, now that his 10-year domain management contract has expired, the Malian government will be able to gather all of the emails that were accidentally misdirected over the past decade, according to the FT.
Mali’s government did not respond to Fortune’s request for comment.
Many of the misdirected emails came from internal sources, according to the FT, with travel agents working for the military, private contractors, and staff regularly misspelling .MIL in official communications.
None of the messages Zuurbier received during his oversight of .ML were marked as classified, and many of them were spam, the FT noted—but some included personal information about military contractors, serving personnel, and employees’ families.
This included medical data, passport details, crew lists, photos of bases, details of internal investigations, and travel plans, according to the news outlet.
According to the report, one FBI agent who was trying to send six messages to their own military email address accidentally sent them to Mali. These emails included a letter from a Turkish diplomat about possible militant activity as well as several briefings on domestic terrorism.
Some of the messages came with disclaimers ranging from “For Official Use Only” to “Not Releasable to the Public or Foreign Governments,” the FT reported.
Other employees accidentally sent password recovery requests to Mali, according to the report, while others sent passwords needed to access Department of Defense documents to the wrong address.
Lt. Cmdr. Tim Gorman, a spokesman for the Pentagon, told Fortune on Monday that the Department of Defense (DoD) is aware of the issue and took all unauthorized disclosures of Controlled National Security Information or Controlled Unclassified Information seriously.
“DoD has implemented policy, training, and technical controls to ensure that emails from the “.mil” domain are not delivered to incorrect domains,” he said. “Such emails are blocked before they leave the .mil domain and the sender is notified that they must validate the email addresses of the intended recipients.”
Gorman added: “While it is not possible to implement technical controls preventing the use of personal email accounts for government business, the Department continues to provide direction and training to DoD personnel.”
Zuurbier told the FT that since the beginning of the year, he had been gathering emails mistakenly sent to Mali in a bid to convince American authorities to address the problem. He has collected more than 110,000 messages, the FT reported.
“This risk is real and could be exploited by adversaries of the U.S.,” he reportedly wrote in a letter to officials earlier this month—just one of several attempts he has reportedly made to engage authorities on the matter.
After realizing what was happening when he took over the .ML domain in 2013, Zuurbier sought legal advice, joined a 2014 trade mission from the Netherlands to ask for help from Dutch diplomats, and sought to alert U.S. authorities on a separate occasion in 2015, it was reported.
Mali, a landlocked West African nation, has a long history of armed rebellion, extremist activity, and military dictatorship. The military council that seized control of the country in 2020 is led by Colonel Assimi Goïta, who is currently serving as Mali’s interim president.
While relations with the West—including the U.S.—have worsened as the country has been engulfed by violence, Mali has continued to strengthen its ties to Russia. The Kremlin stepped in to provide assistance in the mineral-rich country’s ongoing fight against Islamist extremist insurgencies, leading to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—a member of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle—receiving a top honor in Mali earlier this year.
Washington has voiced concern about Moscow’s growing influence in Mali and the surrounding region, while the U.N. has said the alliance—which involves the use of mercenaries—may have led to possible war crimes.
“Where Wagner’s been present, bad things inevitably follow,” U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken warned at a March briefing in Niger’s capital Niamey. “We’ve seen countries find themselves weaker, poorer, more insecure, less independent as a result of their association with Wagner. We’ve also seen Wagner engage in the exploitation of natural resources, bringing corruption with it, bringing violence with it—overall worsening security, not improving it.”
However, Mali’s government has defended its ties to Russia.
Following the failed rebellion by the mercenary Wagner Group in Russia earlier this month, however, it remains unclear whether Russia’s military assistance will continue in Mali—Moscow had enlisted Wagner troops to stave off jihadist fighters in the country.
President Biden recently stated he would deny congressional resolutions to designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. The president’s response comes amid a broader discussion of how to counter the Kremlin’s defiance of international norms and disregard for human rights. While designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism is fraught with political challenges, designating the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, as a terrorist organization would help restrain one of the main perpetrators of atrocities. Wagner’s pattern of violence in Europe and Africa clearly justifies a terrorism designation.
Legal Criteria for a Terrorism Designation
A terrorism designation may appear counterintuitive at first glance, but Wagner’s activity fits the statutory understanding of terrorism: the consistent and intentional use of violence to intimidate and endanger civilians in service of strategic goals.
The United States has two primary types of terrorism sanctions: It can designate a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) or as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Wagner’s actions fit the bill for both. For an FTO designation, U.S. law defines terrorist violence as violence “with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.” Similarly, Executive Order 13224, which created the SDGT designation, defines terrorism as an “act” that is “dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure” and is intended to intimidate or coerce.
As a private military company and state proxy force, Wagner’s actions often lead to war crimes investigations rather than terrorism charges. Indeed, the current list of U.S.-designated entities includes ideologically motivated violent extremist groups (such as al-Qaeda) and cause-oriented paramilitary groups (such as the Real Irish Republican Army) but no private military companies.
However, the House of Representatives and the Senate have both cited Wagner’s atrocities as supporting evidence for Russia’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Fundamentally, U.S. law states that terrorist groups weaponize fear by inflicting violence on people or property, which Wagner does on a routine basis.
Wagner’s Pattern of Violence
Though Russian law criminalizes mercenary work, the Wagner Group operates as a private security force and a proxy force for the Kremlin. The group supplements the Russian military presence in Syria and Ukraine and trains armed forces in Latin America and Africa in support of official bilateral agreements. The Department of the Treasury sanctioned Wagner in 2017 for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea but did not designate it as an SDGT or FTO.
Beyond service to the Kremlin, Wagner also seems to advance the business interests of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Wagner’s primary financier, Prigozhin is linked to multiple businesses, ranging from disinformation troll farms to mining companies, and appears regularly in Kremlin circles, frequently communicating with senior leadership and attending military planning meetings. In many places where Wagner deploys, host nations grant Prigozhin-linked companies contracts and concessions and employ Wagner as a private security force to protect those enterprises with little regard for collateral damage.
In 2018, Russia sent Wagner to the Central African Republic as part of a bilateral agreement to train government forces and provide security to Prigozhin-linked companies, such as M Finans and Lobaye Invest, which obtained access to lucrative gold and diamond mining operations in the country. This past January, Wagner personnel invaded the gold mining town of Aïgbando, setting homes ablaze, forcing hundreds to flee, and killing several dozen civilians. Two local girls later told reporters that Russians abducted and sexually assaulted them for around 10 weeks. France’s ambassador to the United Nations alleged that in the aftermath of the attack, Wagner laid landmines around the town to inhibit further investigation, calling the massacre “part of a method which aims to provoke terror in order to control certain territories and derive profits from them.”
Elsewhere in the Central African Republic, Wagner has attacked miners, summarily executed men, and conducted unprovoked attacks on civilians taking refuge in a local mosque. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations estimated that around 40 percent of the reported human rights abuses in the country happened at the hands of Wagner fighters.
The group has replicated this pattern of violence in other African states. While supporting Khalifa Haftar’s failed bid to install himself as Libya’s ruler in late 2019 and 2020, Wagner fighters left mines and other explosive traps in homes, furniture, and toys in Tripoli, violating international legal prohibition on the use of unmarked mines. In Mali, Wagner’s arrival in December 2021 brought with it a significant increase in civilian murders. Most notably, Wagner joined Malian armed forces in an operation in the town of Moura, where approximately 300 men were summarily executed. On at least three occasions in the spring of 2022, Wagner operatives in Sudan fired into crowds of workers and bystanders in an effort to take over local gold mines.
Wagner’s brutality leapt into international headlines with its role in the Russian military’s massacre in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha. Ongoing documentation of the massacre and survivor testimonials describe summary executions, torture, rape, and wanton destruction. A UN investigation documented 50 civilian executions, while press reporting indicates the civilian death toll was over 1,000. In intercepted communications, Russian soldiers were heard discussing atrocities in a matter-of-fact manner, raising questions about whether there was a deliberate effort to instill fear in the Ukrainian population. Separately, three Wagner mercenaries face war crimes charges for burning houses, systematic torture, and execution of civilians and city leaders in the town of Motyzhyn.
Furthermore, Wagner appears to have indirect ties to the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), a white nationalist group that provides paramilitary training and is a U.S.-designated SDGT. Two graduates of a RIM training camp formed an organization known as Task Force Rusich, which fought alongside Wagner in Ukraine’s Luhansk oblast from 2014 to 2015 and was implicated in Wagner’s atrocities in Palmyra, Syria. In September 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Rusich for its participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and said the group is “associated” with Wagner. Rusich is widely considered to be a subordinate of Wagner, although the exact nature of their relationship is unclear. If Rusich has financial ties to RIM, such as paying for ongoing use of RIM’s training facilities, that may constitute separate grounds for an SDGT designation for Rusich or Wagner by extension.Though Wagner’s ties to the Russian white supremacist movement remain obscure, personal and training connections between Wagner, Rusich, and RIM suggest a possible material connection between Wagner and an existing terrorist organization.
Designation to Disrupt and Defend
Designating the Wagner Group as a terrorist entity would introduce new mechanisms to curb Russian aggression and hold war criminals responsible for their brutality. An FTO or SDGT designation against Wagner would criminalize the provision of any material support to the group and allow U.S. citizens to sue for damages wrought by the group’s acts of terrorism against their person or property — penalties that existing sanctions on the group do not entail. A terrorism designation would also signal to foreign governments that working with Wagner would adversely affect their overall relationship with the United States.
Furthermore, a terrorism designation would not preclude international legal action against Wagner for war crimes or crimes against humanity. But whereas that process can often take years and may never achieve tangible results, as Moscow is unlikely to cooperate, a terrorism designation would take immediate effect. Additionally, a designation would be more potent, targeting the full organization, while legal action pursues individual members.
Wagner’s designation would inhibit Russia’s ability to expand its international influence as the group wields terror all too effectively to advance Russian strategic interests. Designating Wagner would counter Russia’s continued violation of international norms and help protect innocent citizens around the globe.
Madison Urban is an analyst at Valens Global and supports the project on domestic extremism at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Capt. Sara Downing is an active-duty Army officer currently studying at Duke University and is a visiting military analyst at FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. government. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
Last week US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that the Treasury Department will designate the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organisation (TCO). Western states and institutions have explored a variety of legal mechanisms against Wagner in recent years, including terrorism designations and sanctions for supporting separatist forces in Ukraine. The TCO designation is thus the latest measure in a layered sanctioning strategy designed to counter the PMC’s vital and frequently brutal role in advancing Russian state interests internationally. In this piece, we demonstrate that the legal case for the TCO designation is strong. Wagner unambiguously meets the criteria for what constitutes a TCO.
The United States is declaring Wagner a TCO under Executive Order (EO) 13581, established in 2011 to block the assets of “significant transnational criminal organizations” that pose “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” What constitutes a significant transnational criminal organisation under EO 13581 is admittedly broad, including any “group of persons … that includes one or more foreign persons; that engages in an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity involving the jurisdictions of at least two foreign states; and that threatens the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”
As this Perspective details, there is ample evidence to suggest that Wagner engages in an ongoing pattern of serious cross-border criminal activity. Natural resource smuggling in Africa is Wagner’s main criminal enterprise, but it has also been implicated in money laundering and illicit financing. Much of this activity appears to be designed for private gain and to help Russia circumvent and offset the impact of US and European sanctions. Wagner’s transnational criminal activities likely also extend quite a bit further. Another criminal activity that Wagner could be involved in that may come to light as the PMC’s activities are further exposed is trafficking. Wagner likely also engages in the mafia-style actions that violent non-state actors (of which PMCs are one sub-set) often resort to in conflict zones, such as extortion, theft, and armed robbery. Indeed, the group’s trajectory into criminality is only likely to increase due to its members’ feelings of impunity and the highly questionable new recruits that it is now bringing aboard.
The plummeting quality of Wagner recruits is connected to the group’s forces suffering significant casualties in Ukraine. Reporting suggests that, in response, Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin has lowered standards for his mercenaries to the point where he is now deliberately recruiting felons directly from Russian prisons. Additionally, security sources in the Central African Republic (CAR) claim that Wagner is freeing and conscripting criminals from prisons in CAR and Mali, many of whom are reportedly considered terrorist fighters by these governments and were imprisoned for violent crimes. Adding violent criminals to Wagner’s ranks underscores the PMC’s image as a TCO and ensures future anomie in areas where its members operate.
Designating a tool of Russian state power like Wagner involves numerous policy considerations, and we are not arguing in favour of the US’s designation decision. Rather, the point of this Perspective is to explain the legality of, and evidence for, Wagner’s designation for its connections to transnational organised crime.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is an Associate Fellow at ICCT and the founder and chief executive officer of the private firm Valens Global. Before founding Valens, Gartenstein-Ross had established himself as a leading subject matter expert on violent non-state actors and terrorism, with the International Herald Tribune describing him as a “rising star in the counterterrorism community.” He is also a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and leads a project on domestic extremism there. Follow him on Twitter @DaveedGR.
Emelie Chace-Donahue is the director of analysis at Valens Global and supports the firm’s public sector clients.
Colin P. Clarke is a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center. He is the Director of Policy and Research at The Soufan Group, where his research focuses on domestic and transnational terrorism, international security, and geopolitics. Prior to joining The Soufan Group, Clarke was a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he spent a decade researching terrorism, insurgency, and criminal networks. Clarke is also an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), a non-resident Senior Fellow in the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), an Associate Fellow at the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), and a member of the “Network of Experts” at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Руководитель азербайджанского издания «Abzas Media» Ульви Гасанли, предположительно был похищен полицейскими по дороге в бакинский аэропорт. Об этом изданию «Кавказский узел» сообщила главный редактор издания «Abzas Media» Севиндж Вагифгызы. Согласно ее сообщению, сегодня Ульви Гасанли должен был вылететь за рубеж, однако в самолете его не оказалось. Он вышел утром из дома и направился в аэропорт. […]
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Министр обороны США Ллойд Остин прибыл в Киев. «Сегодня я здесь, чтобы передать важное сообщение — Соединенные Штаты будут продолжать поддерживать Украину в их борьбе за свободу против агрессии России, как сейчас, так и в будущем», — говорится в сообщении Остина в X. По словам главы Пентагона, он планирует провести встречи с украинским руководством. Другие […]
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