An Emirati base consisting of an airfield facility and deepwater port was constructed in the city of Berbera in 2017. This base was designed to support Emirati operations in nearby Yemen, with several sources indicating that the UAE operates or operates strike aircraft from that facility. Reports that the UAE cancelled construction efforts and planned to sever ties with Somaliland appear to have been premature. Recent satellite captures of this area further indicate that the existing facilities are being upgraded and augmented by an additional deepwater port.
Key Judgment 1. It is highly likely that the UAE will deploy additional air assets to Berbera in the next six months.
Key Judgment 2. The UAE is likely sponsoring a deepwater port for exclusive military use in Berbera.
Key Judgment 3. There is a realistic probability that Houthi forces could target the base facilities with SRBM-type ordnance in the next six months.
| Name: Berbera – Emirati Base Area | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: An overview of the Emirati Base Area in Berbera, northern Somalia. The new deep water port is located to the north, whereas the airport is located to the south. The Airport area is rather nebulous with no clear or defined perimeter. Rather, multiple perimeters are visible, indeterminant as to which ones de-mark the actual airport. |
Fig. 1| Name: Berbera – Emirati Base Area Close View | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: A close in view of the aircraft tarmac and hangars built prior to April 2023. |
Fig. 2KJ-1. It is highly likely that the UAE will deploy additional air assets to Berbera in the next six months.
a) The northeastern portion of the airport area contains at least 4 discarded airframes of large, civilian type transport aircraft [see Fig. 3A].
b) The presence of derelict airframes indicates that the facility is lacking a dedicated air contingent [see Fig. 3B].
c) Statements by the UAE and local press reports further indicate that the UAE intended to utilize the airport facility as a launch pad for airstrikes in Yemen [source].
d) Last June, the UAE conducted an airstrike against al-Shabaab with a TB-2 Bayraktar drone [source].
e) Further, think tank reporting indicates that the UAE utilized Berbera to conduct strikes against Houthi targets from 2018 onwards [source].
f) Recent satellite imagery from December 2023 to February 2024 shows construction efforts on the tarmac, resulting in new hangars and maintenance/support areas [see Fig. 10, 11, 12].
| Name: Berbera Support Area Overview |
Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: An overview of the base support area. Several derelict airframes are visible, including (2) C-54, DCH-6 TO, and a possible An-24. A solar plant and radio mast are visible nearby the base entrance. |
| Name: Close in view of derelict aircraft | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: A close in view of a probable An-24 or CN-234 and a C-54 with detached props. |
Fig. 3B
KJ-2. The UAE is likely sponsoring a deepwater port for exclusive military use in Berbera.
a) Berbera already has a preexisting deepwater port for commercial use. The port in Berbera is part of a larger push by the UAE to expand its presence in the Horn of Africa [source], [source].
b) UAE naval assets previously docked at the commercial port near the town [source].
c) The construction of new facilities in close proximity to the airbase indicates that the UAE intends to develop a facility for its exclusive use or exploitation [see Fig. 6].
d) The Emirati’s agreed to provide training to Somaliland police units at these facilities [source].
e) Satellite imagery indicates rapid construction underway at a new pier between June and August 2022 [see Fig. 4, 5].
f) Construction efforts into 2023 added compacted earth to the shoreline, indicating intentions to further expand the port facilities. Possible additions in this filled in area include fuel storage and personnel housing [see Fig. 7, 8].
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: A view of the port facility under construction showing active degrading operations underway as early as June of 2022. |
Fig. 4| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: A view from August 2022 showing extensions to the pier as well as new port facility buildings constructed within several months. |
Fig. 5
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: A view from October of 2022 showing additional extensions to the quays. Construction pier remains in the same location since August, however, we can see visible dredging operations underway. |
Fig. 6
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: An access road has been added while the dredging vessel has shifted position. |
Fig. 7
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: By April 2023, construction crews have filled in an area of shoreline with compacted earth. Access roads have become more defined. |
Fig. 8
KJ-3. There is a realistic probability that Houthi forces could target the base facilities with SRBM-type ordnance in the next six months.
a) The new facilities are within striking distance of Houthi MR and SR type ballistic missiles [source].
b) Somalia previously supported Saudi action against the Houthi’s in Yemen [source].
c) The UAE engaged Houthi targets in Hodeida in January. Moreover, the Houthi’s directly targeted Emirati territory that same month [source].
d) The large concentration of hangars and support buildings provides an optimum targeting for Houthi ordnance [see Fig. 10, 11].
e) The facility is in use as early as December of 2023, as evidenced by an apparent aircraft on the tarmac [see Fig. 10].
f) The rear support area under construction appears to be barrack type housing for base personnel [see Fig. 11].
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: An overview from 2024 showing new additions to the Berbera complex. |
Fig. 9
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: A possible aircraft is detected on the tarmac. Construction begins on a support structure and hangars on the tarmac. |
Fig. 10
| Name: Berbera Port Overview | Location: 10°23’3.75″N, 44°55’50.08″E | Description: By January 2024, hangar and support building construction is completed. Meanwhile, construction begins on a rear support area. |
Fig. 11
Analytical Summary
We have high confidence in our assessment that the UAE will deploy air assets to Berbera in the next 6 months. We base this assessment on imagery, international press reporting and think tank reporting. We assume that the airport is for joint civilian and military use. Should this assumption prove incorrect, we would expect to see a noticeable lack of dedicated refueling facilities constructed over the next 6 months. We considered the alternative that the UAE will utilize pre-existing air facilities in the Emirates, but dismissed it due to the strategic location of Berbera at the Bab-el-Mandeb.
Naval Foothold
We have high confidence in our assessment that the UAE intends to leverage Berbera for exclusive military use. We base this assessment on imagery, international press reporting, local press reporting, think tank reporting and official statements from the Emirati government. We assume that regional authorities have pre-standing agreements with Dubai for naval access. Should this assumption prove incorrect, we would expect to see warships of other nations dock at Berbera in the next 6 months. We considered the alternative that the facility is exclusively civilian, but dismissed it due to the presence of UAE naval assets in the region.
Line of Fire
We have medium confidence in our assessment that Houthi forces will target the base area. We base this assessment on imagery, international press reporting and think tank reporting. We assume that US/UK airstrikes have not sufficiently degraded Houthi offensive capacities. Should this assumption prove incorrect, we would expect to see a resumption of shipping though the Red Sea in the next 3 months. We considered the alternative that the Houthis may elect to stay further action against the UAE, but dismissed it due to the Emirate’s long standing participation in the anti-Houthi coalition.
Imagery Annex
Fig. 12