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The Gusinsky’s Revenge, Part 2: The Deus ex machina


Selected Posts: Gusinsky, Lesin, and the FBI: The Goose and his Revenge: The Investigation in tweets 

November 15, 2025

The Gusinsky’s Revenge

Part 2   |   Part 1

The Investigation in tweets

 

The Deus ex machina

Gusinsky and Lesin – GS

Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Lesin were two influential Russian media figures involved in the post-Soviet media landscape. Gusinsky, a prominent media mogul and founder of the NTV television network, had a contentious relationship with the Kremlin and ultimately fled Russia. Lesin, a former press minister and media advisor to the Kremlin, was instrumental in shaping the state-controlled media and played a key role in developing the industry. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]

 

Here’s a breakdown of their roles and interactions:

 

Vladimir Gusinsky: [1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
  • Media Mogul: Gusinsky was a highly successful businessman who founded NTV, the first major independent television network in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  • Controversial Figure:His media outlets were critical of the government, leading to ongoing conflict with the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin.
  • Fled Russia: After facing criminal charges and pressure from the government, Gusinsky was forced to flee Russia in 2000.
  • Later Life: He continued to be involved in media, though his influence in Russia diminished.
Mikhail Lesin: [1, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]
  • Government Official and Advisor:Lesin served as Russia’s Minister of Press, Television, and Radio, and later as an advisor to President Putin.
  • Shaped State Media: He played a significant role in establishing and controlling state-aligned media, often working to consolidate power and promote the Kremlin’s agenda.
  • Controversial Figure: Like Gusinsky, Lesin was a complex and controversial figure, with critics accusing him of suppressing media freedom.
  • Mysterious Death: Lesin died in 2015 under circumstances that remain debated, with some sources attributing his death to natural causes and others suggesting foul play.
Key Interaction: [1, 25]
  • Gusinsky and Lesin’s paths crossed when Lesin was in a position of power within the government and Gusinsky was a target. Lesin was instrumental in the crackdown on independent media, including NTV, and ultimately contributed to the decline of Gusinsky’s media empire.
In essence, Gusinsky represented the struggle for independent media in Russia, while Lesin represented the state’s efforts to control the narrative. [1, 26, 27, 28]



AI responses may include mistakes.


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AI Review: How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies? How will the Trump’s cuts affect the CIA?


How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies? How will the Trump’s cuts affect the CIA? “In conclusion, while a simple “efficiency score” for an intelligence agency is unrealistic, a comprehensive and thoughtful evaluation framework that considers outcomes, processes, and perceptions, while acknowledging the inherent challenges, can provide valuable insights into how effectively these vital organizations are operating and where improvements can be made.”

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How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies?

Gemini 

Measuring the efficiency of intelligence agencies is a complex endeavor, fraught with unique challenges not typically encountered when evaluating other government organizations or private sector entities. Due to the clandestine nature of their work, the sensitivity of their information, and the long-term and often indirect impact of their efforts, traditional metrics of efficiency, such as cost-benefit analyses or direct output measurements, often fall short.

However, a more nuanced approach can be taken by considering a range of factors and indicators, both qualitative and quantitative:

1. Outcome-Based Measures (Effectiveness leading to Efficiency):

  • Prevention of Threats: Arguably the most critical measure. How effective is the agency in preventing terrorist attacks, cyber intrusions, espionage, and other threats to national security? This is difficult to quantify directly but can be assessed through:
    • Number of disrupted plots or attacks: While a significant indicator, it doesn’t capture the full scope of deterrence.
    • Reduced impact of successful attacks: Were the consequences mitigated due to timely warnings or intelligence-led responses?
    • Expert assessments and after-action reviews: Qualitative analyses of how intelligence contributed to averting or minimizing harm.
  • Strategic Warning: How timely and accurate is the intelligence provided to policymakers regarding emerging threats and crises?
    • Accuracy of forecasts and assessments: Evaluating historical intelligence products against actual events.
    • Timeliness of dissemination: Was the information available when needed for decision-making?
    • Impact on policy decisions: Did the intelligence inform and improve the quality of national security strategies?
  • Support to Operations: How effectively does intelligence support military, law enforcement, and diplomatic efforts?
    • Actionable intelligence provided: Did the intelligence lead to successful operations or outcomes?
    • Relevance and accuracy of targeting data: In military contexts, this is a critical measure.
    • Situational awareness enhancement: Did intelligence improve the understanding of the operational environment?

2. Process-Oriented Measures (How efficiently are tasks performed?):

  • Timeliness of Production and Dissemination: How quickly is raw intelligence processed, analyzed, and delivered to the relevant consumers?
    • Mean time to produce finished intelligence products.
    • Speed of dissemination through appropriate channels.
  • Resource Management: How efficiently are financial, human, and technological resources utilized?
    • Cost-effectiveness of collection platforms and operations.
    • Personnel productivity and workload management.
    • Minimization of redundancies and overlaps within and between agencies.
  • Information Management: How effectively is intelligence data stored, retrieved, and shared (appropriately)?
    • Efficiency of data processing and analysis tools.
    • Accessibility of relevant information to authorized users.
    • Security and integrity of data holdings.
  • Accuracy and Reliability: What is the track record of the agency in producing accurate and reliable intelligence?
    • Low rate of errors or retractions.
    • High confidence levels in assessments, clearly communicated.
    • Effective validation and vetting processes for sources and information.

3. Trust and Perception-Based Measures:

  • Public Trust and Confidence: While difficult to directly link to efficiency, public trust can impact an agency’s legitimacy and effectiveness in the long run.
    • Surveys of public opinion (though these can be influenced by many factors).
    • Media coverage and public discourse surrounding the agency.
  • Customer Satisfaction: Feedback from policymakers, military commanders, and other intelligence consumers regarding the utility and quality of intelligence products and services.
    • Formal feedback mechanisms and surveys.
    • Informal communication and engagement.
  • Adherence to Legal and Ethical Standards: Efficient intelligence gathering should not come at the expense of legality and ethics.
    • Number of legal challenges or violations.
    • Oversight body reports and findings.
    • Internal compliance mechanisms and audits.

Challenges in Measuring Efficiency:

  • Secrecy and Classification: The very nature of intelligence work limits transparency and the ability to use open-source data for evaluation.
  • Long-Term Impact: The benefits of intelligence work, such as preventing a future attack, are often intangible and difficult to attribute directly.
  • Complexity of Threats: The evolving nature of threats requires constant adaptation, making it hard to establish consistent benchmarks.
  • Attribution Issues: It can be challenging to definitively prove that an intelligence action directly led to a specific outcome.
  • Politicization: Intelligence assessments can sometimes be influenced by political considerations, complicating objective evaluation.
  • Lack of Standardized Metrics: There is no universally agreed-upon framework for measuring intelligence efficiency across different agencies and countries.

Moving Forward:

Measuring intelligence agency efficiency requires a multi-faceted approach that combines quantitative data where possible with qualitative assessments and expert judgment. Emphasis should be placed on:

  • Developing clear objectives and priorities: This provides a basis for evaluating whether the agency is achieving its intended goals.
  • Establishing robust oversight mechanisms: Independent bodies can provide objective evaluations and identify areas for improvement.
  • Promoting a culture of evaluation: Encouraging internal assessments and lessons learned.
  • Investing in data analytics and technology: To better track processes and outcomes while respecting security constraints.
  • Fostering dialogue between intelligence professionals, policymakers, and oversight bodies: To develop more effective and relevant measures of efficiency.

In conclusion, while a simple “efficiency score” for an intelligence agency is unrealistic, a comprehensive and thoughtful evaluation framework that considers outcomes, processes, and perceptions, while acknowledging the inherent challenges, can provide valuable insights into how effectively these vital organizations are operating and where improvements can be made.

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Intelligence and Counterintelligence – AI Review

https://www.google.com/collections/s/list/nxTRV_7dRICjjI8L5Iuw3A/If3OWsa6Qb8

Measuring the efficiency of intelligence agency AI systems requires a multi-faceted approach, encompassing quantitative performance metrics, qualitative assessments, and ethical considerations. Key areas to focus on include system performance and outcomes, risk management, ethical implications, social impact, and organizational readiness and adoption. [1, 2]
Key Metrics and Considerations: [3, 3]
  • System Performance and Outcomes: [3, 3]
    • Accuracy: How often the AI system’s predictions match actual outcomes. [3, 3]
    • Speed and Latency: How quickly the AI system can process information and generate results. [4, 4]
    • Efficiency and Scalability: How efficiently the AI system utilizes resources (time, space, energy) and how well it handles increasing workloads. [5, 5, 6, 7]
    • Task Completion Time: How long it takes for the AI to complete assigned tasks. [8, 8]
    • User Satisfaction: How effectively the AI system assists users in their work. [9, 9]
    • Uptime and Error Rate: How consistently the AI system is available and how often it produces errors. [10, 10]
  • Risk Management: [11, 11]
    • Data Privacy and Security: How well the AI system protects sensitive data and prevents unauthorized access. [11, 11, 12, 13, 14]
    • Compliance: Adherence to relevant regulations and ethical guidelines. [1, 1, 15, 16]
  • Ethical Implications: [11, 11, 17, 17]
    • Bias Detection and Mitigation: Identifying and addressing any biases in the AI system’s training data and algorithms. [11, 11, 17, 17, 18]
    • Explainability and Interpretability: Understanding how the AI system arrives at its conclusions and ensuring transparency. [11, 11, 19, 20, 21]
  • Social Impact: [11, 11]
    • Impact on Human Workforce: Assessing how the AI system affects the roles and responsibilities of intelligence personnel. [11, 11, 22]
    • Bias in Algorithms: Ensuring that AI systems do not perpetuate or amplify existing societal biases. [11, 11, 23]
  • Organizational Readiness and Adoption: [1, 1]
    • Training and Support: Providing adequate training and support for personnel to effectively use the AI system. [1, 1, 24, 25]
    • Organizational Culture: Ensuring that the organization is receptive to and able to integrate AI into its workflow. [1, 1, 26, 27]
Beyond the Metrics: [11, 11]
  • Human Oversight: Maintaining human oversight of the AI system to ensure accuracy, fairness, and accountability. [11, 11, 28, 29, 30, 31]
  • Continuous Monitoring and Improvement: Regularly evaluating the AI system’s performance and making adjustments as needed. [1, 1, 32]
  • Collaboration and Knowledge Sharing: Fostering collaboration between intelligence agencies, researchers, and policymakers to develop best practices for using AI in intelligence. [11, 11, 33, 34]
Generative AI is experimental.
AI Review: How to measure the efficiency of the Intelligence Agencies?
Measuring the efficiency of intelligence agencies is a complex endeavor, as their work often involves secrecy and long-term impacts that are difficult to quantify

. 

Here’s a breakdown of how one might approach measuring their efficiency, with a focus on challenges and potential metrics:
Challenges:
  • Secrecy and Sensitivity: Many operations and results are classified, making public or independent assessment difficult.
  • Attribution and Causality: It can be challenging to directly link specific intelligence activities to positive outcomes or to determine if a particular event would have unfolded differently without the agency’s involvement.
  • Defining Success: What constitutes “success” for an intelligence agency can be multifaceted and subjective, ranging from preventing terrorist attacks to informing policy decisions.
  • Long-Term Impacts: The impact of intelligence work may not be immediately apparent and can unfold over years or decades. 
Potential Metrics & Evaluation Areas:
  • Timeliness and Accuracy of Intelligence:
    • How quickly and reliably does the agency deliver actionable intelligence to decision-makers?
    • How accurate are the agency’s predictions and assessments of threats and opportunities?
  • Effectiveness in Achieving Objectives:
    • Has the agency successfully disrupted terrorist plots, countered foreign espionage, or supported military operations?
    • How effectively does the agency contribute to achieving national security goals as defined in strategic documents like the National Security Strategy?
  • Efficiency of Operations and Resource Utilization:
    • How cost-effective are the agency’s intelligence gathering methods and analysis processes?
    • Are there areas where duplication or inefficiency can be addressed?
  • Responsiveness to Policy Needs:
    • How effectively does the agency anticipate and respond to the evolving intelligence needs of policymakers?
    • Is the agency’s intelligence product tailored to the specific requirements of different customers (e.g., policymakers, military leaders)?
  • Adaptability and Innovation:
    • How effectively does the agency adapt to emerging threats and technological advancements (e.g., AI, cyber)?
    • Does the agency foster a culture of innovation and continuous improvement in its methods and technologies?
  • Compliance and Oversight:
    • Does the agency operate within the bounds of the law and respect civil liberties?
    • How effectively are oversight mechanisms (e.g., legislative committees, inspectors general) functioning? 
Methods for Evaluation:
  • Independent Reviews: Commissions or panels of experts could conduct periodic reviews, accessing classified information and interviewing agency personnel.
  • Performance Audits: Inspectors General within the agencies or parent organizations can assess operational efficiency and compliance.
  • Feedback Mechanisms: Soliciting feedback from policymakers and other users of intelligence products can provide insights into the agency’s effectiveness and responsiveness.
  • Comparative Analysis: Benchmarking the performance of intelligence agencies against those of other countries (where possible) can offer insights into best practices and areas for improvement. 
Important Considerations:
  • Balancing Security and Transparency: Any evaluation framework must carefully balance the need for accountability and transparency with the need to protect sensitive information and sources.
  • Avoiding Unrealistic Expectations: Intelligence agencies operate in a complex and uncertain environment, and not all threats can be anticipated or prevented.
  • Qualitative Insights: Metrics should be complemented by qualitative assessments that consider the broader context and the agency’s contribution to national security. 
AI Mode is experimental and can make mistakes. Learn more

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Bibi, Putin, Trump!


Will Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu Bless Donald Trump With an October Surprise? | The Nation

 

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Bibi, Putin, Trump!

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah, and Israel

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OSINT study of blockade, genocide by Azerbaijan in Karabakh shows striking similarities with Israel’s war in Gaza



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from NEWS.am (English).

The Zovighian Public Office (ZPO) has published a second edition of an open-source intelligence (OSINT) and geolocation report at the one-year mark of the military assault of Azerbaijan against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, known to Armenians as Artsakh. The report, commissioned to explore if Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on the indigenous Armenian population at the Lachin Corridor, shows how an unconventional war began in December 2022 before shifting into a conventional war in September 2023, successfully appropriating the area and expelling the community from their ancestral homeland.

Titled, “From blockade to war: The ethnic cleansing of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh,” the OSINT study examines and refutes three consistent claims made by the Azerbaijani government during the blockade:

  • Claim 1: There was no road closure and no blockade.
  • Claim 2: Azerbaijan had the right to erect a checkpoint at its border with Armenia.
  • Claim 3: There was no blockade because alternative roads could be used.

“It was a perfect blockade,” said ZPO Founder Lynn Zovighian, who co-authored the report. “Azerbaijan exploited geographic and geopolitical vulnerabilities, under the cover of international credibility, and successfully ethnically cleansed the historic Artsakhi Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh with no consequences.”

“One year since the people of Artsakh were forced to flee their homeland, families continue to suffer from losing their homes and livelihoods. This report painstakingly demonstrates the genocidal strategy of Azerbaijan against the Artsakhi Armenians,” said Gegham Stepanyan Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Studying the first claim, the report shows how the so-called eco-activist protest at the Lachin Corridor Road created both a physical obstruction and hostile space, barring all safe and free movement of food, medicine, and essential items from reaching the population, instigating a population-wide humanitarian disaster. A geolocation study confirmed that there were no mines in the immediate vicinity and that any protest of alleged Armenian mining activities in the region was unexplained and unjustified.

Analyzing the second claim clarified how pressure by the international community pushed Azerbaijan to replace the so-called protestors with an official checkpoint, further militarizing and institutionalizing the comprehensive siege of Nagorno-Karabakh. Insufficient efforts by the international community to stop Azerbaijan’s siege and their manipulations of sovereign rights and territorial integrity, the checkpoint effectively blocked all movement of not only residents and trade, but also humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Studying the third claim helped confirm that no viable alternative route to the Lachin Corridor existed by land between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

The report concludes that Azerbaijan was able to manipulate a confounded rhetoric to build diplomatic credibility with the international community, without needing to give away any negotiating power or backtrack on any of their positions.

“Almost two years since the illegal blockade began, this credibility remains very intact, and has been fortified by Azerbaijan’s further crimes, intentional failures to implement orders by the International Court of Justice, and the genocidal aggression and forced displacement of our people. Unfortunately, the perpetrators of the genocide have remained unpunished and have even been encouraged by the international community, winning their bid to host COP29,” explained Artak Beglaryan, Founder of Artsakh Union and former Minister of State and Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan has a history of weaponizing environmental causes and platforms, and will be hosting COP29 in November.

An expert panel will be hosted on September 30 to present key OSINT findings featured in this report with diplomats, analysts, and journalists.

“High quality evidence is essential in seeking justice and accountability for international crimes. Azerbaijan’s crimes against the Armenians of Artsakh Nagorno-Karabakh remain unpunished for now, but the collection and preservation of credible and reliable evidence will ensure that those most responsible can be held responsible at any time, and that time will surely come,” said international human rights lawyer Sheila Paylan.

This new edition is now available in the Arabic language as the Gaza War nears its one-year mark on October 7.

“Like Azerbaijan, Israel is successfully employing similar strategies in Gaza against the Palestinian people today,” explained Zovighian.

Israel and Azerbaijan have an intimate decades-long military and trade friendship based on oil, advanced military technology, and intelligence sharing.

Zovighian added, “The success of the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade and takeover by Azerbaijan taught Israel that they too could terrorize, starve, and expel an entire population with a free hand and no consequences. This is what happens when perpetrators and criminals in power are not held to account.”

The Artsakh Union, a grassroots civil society organization, was established by Artak Beglaryan following the forced displacement of the Armenians of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) after the genocidal aggression and nine-month-long blockade by Azerbaijan in 2023. Its mission is to advocate for the collective and individual rights of the Artsakh Armenians globally. It is committed to facilitating international justice and accountability and protect the right of return of the historic Armenian community to their ancestral homeland.

The Zovighian Public Office was established in 2015 to serve communities facing crises and crimes of atrocity. We are dedicated to amplifying their voices through research, culture, advocacy, and diplomacy.


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America has a McGonigal problem


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America has a McGonigal problem

The case of Charles McGonigal is bigger than one corrupt FBI agent.

In fact, it’s bigger than the entire FBI.

The legal case against Charles McGonigal, the FBI’s former New York counterintelligence chief — a scandal that launched a thousand conspiracy theories — is beginning to wind down. Last week, a judge in the Southern District of New York sentenced McGonigal to 50 months in prison; a second judge in Washington, DC, is expected to sentence McGonigal on a different set of charges in February.

But the bigger story — about transnational flows of money, intelligence, and influence, and the weakness of the legal and ethical firewalls that are supposed to constrain them — is just beginning.

The two McGonigal indictments offer a rare glimpse of the inner workings of the Acela corridor, a global bazaar where contacts, secrets, and influence are swapped for millions while the laws that are supposed to protect US national security interests are often ignored.

And now, with McGonigal’s two guilty pleas and first sentencing, that rare window into how things really work inside the steakhouses of Washington and Manhattan is closing.

McGonigal was embraced by this clubby world of lobbyists and law enforcement dons even as he brought home bags of cash to fund his secret double life.

In November of last year, BI was first to break the news that prosecutors were scrutinizing McGonigal’s contacts with Albanian officials and a powerful Russian oligarch. When McGonigal was arrested and charged in January, the media and Capitol Hill reacted with shock. How could one of the FBI’s senior-most counter-intelligence officials retire and then illegally take money from a sanctioned Russian oligarch he had been investigating?

But that was before Robert Menendez, who is still a sitting Democratic senator from New Jersey, was indicted for allegedly accepting gold bars and bundles of cash so that military aid could keep flowing to the Egypt’s authoritarian government.

That was before FBI agents seized the phones of Eric Adams, who is still the mayor of New York, as part of a probe into campaign donations from the government of Turkey.

If McGonigal’s corruption was surprising then, it should be less surprising now. Official corruption in America goes beyond one agency, one administration, or one political party. It isn’t political. It’s cultural, the product of a society so obsessed with wealth that even its best-compensated public officials see themselves as middle-class strivers. Despite $850,000 in income and $1.5 million in assets, according to his pre-sentencing report, McGonigal’s attorneys tried to excuse his behavior by saying that he needed “to find a way to earn a living.” “It’s not high society,” his lead attorney, Seth DuCharme, argued in a Manhattan federal court on Thursday. “He has prestige, and he has respect, but he’s not a billionaire.”

Oleg Deripaska, the Russian oligarch who hired McGonigal, is a billionaire, one with longstanding ties to Vladimir Putin and whose alleged involvement with bribery, murder, and organized crime was cited by the US Treasury Department. (Deripaska has denied all wrongdoing, and has publicly distanced himself from Putin since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.)

Beyond the illegality of McGonigal taking Deripaska’s money in violation of US sanctions, Assistant US Attorney Hagan Scotten made clear in court why their relationship should be so worrying. Pushing back on an argument by McGonigal’s attorneys that his crime was less serious than transferring military equipment, Scotten asked the judge to consider the value to the Kremlin of “having a former counter-intelligence chief on their payroll. What is more valuable to them?”

“How much would Putin ask his oligarchs to pay here?” Scotten went on. “How much would that have been worth to him?”

While the government has never alleged that McGonigal was spying for Russia, Scotten believed that’s where things were likely headed. McGonigal “cannot claim that he was unaware that he was selling his service to a scoundrel working against America’s interests,” the New York prosecutors wrote in their filing on his sentencing. “The investigative skills, contacts, and influence of a former senior American counterintelligence officer are of obvious, and dangerous, value to an agent of Vladimir Putin.”

The entire McGonigal story, as laid out in the government’s filings and BI’s reporting, reads like the opening chapters of a classic spy novel: Operatives spot and then recruit a hapless minion and set about gradually turning his loyalties around to align with theirs. McGonigal was supposed to be one of the FBI’s top grandmasters at this game, and what might be most astonishing about the allegations is the degree to which he apparently allowed his Russian associates to remake him into their pawn.

While he was still working at the FBI, McGonigal was introduced by one former Russian diplomat to another, more senior one, with rumored ties to Russian intelligence who worked with Deripaska. He was, according to the government, asked to do something simple but also, arguably, slightly compromising — arrange for the second diplomat’s daughter to receive VIP treatment from the New York City Police Department. A few months later, after McGonigal’s retirement, he met with Deripaska at two of his residences, in London and Vienna. And then he started accepting Deripaska’s money, surreptitiously. It flowed from a Russian bank to one shell company based in Cyprus to another controlled by a friend.

Judge Jennifer H. Rearden appeared to find Scotten’s argument compelling. Last week, she sentenced McGonigal to 50 months in prison, 3 years probation, and a $40,000 fine. McGonigal’s lawyers, citing his record of service within the FBI, had asked the judge for no additional confinement. Rearden ordered McGonigal to turn himself in on February 26. He will be sentenced in a Washington, DC, district court under a second plea agreement on February 16.

In New York, prosecutors said, McGonigal continued to wield the privileges and leverage the contacts that he’d enjoyed as the FBI’s New York City counter-intelligence chief, even though he no longer held that job. He traveled the world for meetings with foreign ministers, heads of state, and titans of industry — including a London get-together with Deripaska that was so alarming to British intelligence agents that they alerted their US counterparts. And back in New York, according to prosecutors, McGonigal continued to put an FBI placard on the windshield of his car, so he could park wherever he pleased.

This is who the FBI chose to promote to one of its most senior positions and entrust with its most sensitive secrets. In recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, FBI Director Christopher Wray said the Justice Department’s inspector general is “engaged” in scrutinizing the McGonigal matter. Members of Congress from both parties have also demanded answers of the FBI.

But McGonigal’s two plea agreements mean there is likely a lot about his career that may never be made public. These include his alleged attempts (after retiring) to get paid for arranging meetings with UN officials, and his role in the Trump-Russia investigation, and his time in the FBI’s New York Field Office during the crucial months just before the 2016 election.

“People get caught up in their Bond fantasies, their addiction to money, and their need to maintain their indispensability by offering more and more,” said one Washington insider familiar with the intelligence world. “It’s a very small step from selling services to foreign oligarchs to acting as the agent of a foreign government.”

Nevertheless, foreign oligarchs remain among the core clientele of otherwise respectable lawyers, lobbyists, and former US officials. McGonigal is not the end of this story, but rather, a warning. The US should be most worried about those who are still getting away with it.

Mattathias Schwartz is chief national security correspondent at Business Insider. He can be reached at schwartz79@protonmail.com. 


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The Last Hour of Prigozhin’s Plane


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At around 5:30 pm Moscow time on August 23, the Embraer Legacy 600 private business jet took to the skies. Launching from an airport near the Russian capital, the 13-seater plane, which has a white body and blue tail, has been linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the brutal Russian mercenary outfit Wagner Group.

At 5:46 pm, once the plane was clear of Moscow—an area where location-tracking GPS signals are frequently blocked—receivers belonging to flight-tracking network Flightradar24 started picking up signals from the Embraer Legacy. For the next 34 minutes, Prigozhin’s plane was sending out data about its altitude, speed, and autopilot settings that allowed its movements to be tracked.

During this time, the Embraer Legacy appeared to be fine. It reached a cruising altitude of 28,000 feet before briefly climbing to 30,000 feet, and it was traveling at around a ground speed of around 513 knots. Its flight path headed northwest, away from Moscow and in the direction of Russia’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg.

At 6:19 pm, around 30 seconds before the plane stopped transmitting data altogether, it plunged 8,000 feet toward the ground. Its last recorded altitude was 19,725, as it flew by the Kuzhenkino village in the Tver Region. The descent was “dramatic,” according to Flightradar’s analysis.

Since the plane smashed into the earth, killing all those onboard, Russian aviation services, Telegram channels linked to Wagner, and the country’s state-controlled media have reported that Prigozhin was listed as a passenger. The country’s aviation agency named the Wagner boss among 10 people on the plane, along with other senior Wagner members, including cofounder Dmitri Utkin and three crew members.

Officials, according to Russian state media, are investigating the crash and what may have caused it, and have reportedly recovered the bodies. It has been widely speculated that the plane could have been shot down by Russian air defenses, perhaps in response to Prigozhin’s attempted coup two months ago. No evidence to back this up has been presented yet, with Russian president Vladimir Putin saying he has sent his condolences to the families of the dead and investigations are looking into what happened. (One anonymous Western intelligence official told The New York Times that they believe Prigozhin was on the plane. Meanwhile, US president Joe Biden has said there is “not much that happens in Russia that Putin’s not behind.“)

Thanks to Russia’s heavy censorship and propaganda machines, the verifiable truth of what happened to the Embraer Legacy may never be known, experts say.

Amid the dramatic and unfolding incident, there has been a void of official information and a swirl of unconfirmed theories. However, the event highlights how powerful Russia’s grip on its information space is: The country controls its media, has banned independent outlets, and tightly censors the internet and online services available in the country. The episode also continues to show how useful even small amounts of open source information—such as photos or videos posted to social media and open source data, such as flight information—can be in establishing what may have happened. Open source intelligence, known as OSINT, is already being inspected by researchers.

FlightRadar is one of a tiny number of sources of verifiable information about the fate of the Embraer Legacy 600 and, by extension, those onboard the plane. Since the plane stopped transmitting data, one video has emerged on social media showing a plane in pieces dramatically falling toward Earth.

OSINT investigators have confirmed that this happened around the Tver region, the plane’s last known location, by comparing landmarks in the video, such as trees and metal pylons, with existing photos of the location. Another video of the crash site reportedly shows parts of the wreckage matching previous images of Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600. (However, one false video posted to X, the platform previously known as Twitter, has been viewed around a million times.)

Elise Thomas, an investigator at the Centre for Information Resilience, a nonprofit that conducts open source research to expose human rights abuses and counter disinformation, says that within hours the FlightRadar data and confirmed videos from the site gave people a glimpse of what may have happened. “But at the end of the day, we are probably going to be dependent on Russian sources at some level,” she says. These could include Russian government agencies or Telegram channels, which may not be trustworthy. “In some ways, maybe the most likely outcome here is that we just never know the absolute truth of what happened,” she says.

Getting factual information out of Russia isn’t easy—and it has become harder since the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022. “The information space has been tightening over time,” says Natalia Krapiva, tech-legal counsel at digital rights nonprofit Access Now. Over the past decade, Krapiva says, the Kremlin has passed laws and taken other measures to control the internet, censor what people can access, throttle the media, and outlaw independent reporting.

Almost all independent media in Russia has been “banned, blocked” or declared “foreign agents” since February of last year, according to media freedom organization Reporters Without Borders. “Those that survive have belonged to allies of the Kremlin for a few years, or they are forced to strict self-censorship, because of banned subjects and terms,” it says in its 2023 annual ranking. Freedom House, an organization that tracks threats to democracy and freedom, ranks Russia as one of the worst countries for online freedoms.

On top of this, Russia has for years run disinformation campaigns and appeared to lie about public incidents at home and abroad. Prigozhin ran the notorious Internet Research Agency, which created reams of fake news and meddled in the 2016 US elections. Two Russian agents who walked into the UK in 2018 and poisoned Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia later appeared on Russian state television and claimed that they were simply in the country to visit the British city of Salisbury to see its cathedral. And Russian officials changed their story multiple times around the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in 2014, which killed 298 people—reams of open source evidence were presented by investigative journalism unit Bellingcat.

When it comes to Prigozhin and the crash, Russia’s informal network of so-called military bloggers is also involved. In the void of official information about Russia’s war, these military correspondents have appeared on Telegram, in some cases pushing their updates to more than a million people. These accounts are largely pro-Russia, although they often have different allegiances that further muddy the waters. “Some of these people were working for Prigozhin,” says Thomas. “Some of them we know have links to the FSB or GRU,” referring to Russia’s intelligence services. “Some of them probably have links to the Russian security services that we don’t know about.”

These channels have pushed a range of theories about the crash, claiming to have confirmed that Prigozhin is dead and suggesting that they would “march” on Moscow. There have also been reports on possible causes of the crash. According to Meduza, the widely read independent Russian news source, suggestions are being circulated on Telegram that investigators suspect a bomb could have been attached to the plane and that law enforcement may have a suspect in mind. Neither claim has been officially confirmed, Meduza notes.

“Looking at the information that is either available or not available is not enough,” says Tanya Lokot, an associate professor in digital media and society at Dublin City University who researches internet and media freedom. Lokot says it’s essential to consider the context of any information published from official Russian sources or in Telegram channels. For instance, she says, it is important to scrutinize why certain information—such as a list of names—may have been released at a particular time.

Lokot says it is also important to understand the motives of whoever is in control of this kind of information and how and when they decide to release it, as that helps shape a bigger narrative. “How they are presenting this incident and the fallout from this incident is really important to understand because it helps us also understand how they’re trying to control the information space to make sure that it fits their broader strategic narrative,” she says. “The desired at least strategic narrative is the Russian state wants to show that it remains in control of the situation, whatever that situation is.”


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Azerbaijan Bolsters Cooperation With Balkan Countries


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On July 6, Albanian President Bayram Begai visited Azerbaijan and engaged in discussions with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev on bilateral political relations, joint activities in international organizations, trade, economic matters and investment opportunities (Kaspi.az; Report.az, July 8). These talks underlined Baku’s increased attention to deepening its partnerships with countries in the Balkans. In the case of Albanian-Azerbaijani relations, Aliyev declared, “I would call these relations excellent.”

In recent years, official visits between Azerbaijan and the countries in the region have been steadily intensifying (President.az, July 7). For example, during the 2022 Francophonie Summit, Albania blocked a special resolution that included a clause that Baku characterized as “anti-Azerbaijan.” Interestingly, despite internal conflicts and disagreements in the Balkans, Azerbaijan has managed to establish balanced and rapidly developing relations with each country in the region. Recently, the Azerbaijani president embarked on visits to Albania and Serbia, and, on April 13, he made a trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina (Azertag, November 24, 2022; see EDM, April 24). These visits built on past progress made by Azerbaijan during official talks in Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia and Romania in the latter part of 2022, as well as meetings with the prime ministers of Croatia and Montenegro during the World Economic Forum in January 2023. Equally important are the recent visits of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian presidents as well as Serbian prime minister to Baku (Report.az, April 25).

In 2011, Azerbaijan was selected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council from Eastern Europe for a two-year term; currently, Albania is fulfilling this role, and this shared designation in and of itself gives special meaning to the two countries’ diplomatic relations (News.un.org, October 24, 2011). Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Albania in 2022, and in a reciprocal gesture, Albania plans to open its embassy in Baku sometime in 2023 (President.az, July 7).

Beyond Albania, in 2022, Azerbaijan and Serbia signed a memorandum on strategic partnership and cooperation. Earlier, in 2021, they signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation (Azertag, November 24, 2022). Additionally, during Aliyev’s visit to Bulgaria in 2015, a joint declaration on strategic partnership was signed, establishing the Azerbaijan-Bulgaria Strategic Dialogue (Musavat.com, accessed August 17).

In recent years, the expansion of relations between Azerbaijan and the Balkan countries has been influenced not only by traditional factors but also by increasing regional tensions, especially Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and the recent disputes of Albania and Azerbaijan with Iran. Their growing closeness is additionally influenced by geography, shared interests and security concerns, as well as a common history under Soviet influence. For Azerbaijan, the region is significant as it provides access to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic seas. While not having direct access, Azerbaijan benefits from export and transit opportunities through ports in Georgia and Turkey, enabling the transportation of its goods to Balkan countries. Additionally, critical transit corridors from Asia to Europe pass through Azerbaijan further enhancing its pivotal role (1news.az, December 23, 2022).

Indeed, Baku plays a key role in helping the Balkans states diversify their energy sources. Particularly, amid the war in Ukraine, Moscow’s threats to Europe’s energy security have elevated the importance of alternative sources. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which transports Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe, passes through the Balkans via Greece and Albania. In 2022, Azerbaijan supplied 1 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from only its Shah Deniz field to Bulgaria through the TAP via the Greece-Bulgaria gas interconnector (Musavat.com, accessed August 17). Currently, Azerbaijani gas is being transported to Albania, also through the TAP. The primary goal is to eventually transport this gas from the Adriatic to Italy. Additionally, using Albania as a transit point, other Balkan countries can receive gas from Azerbaijan, as they have expressed interest in expanding the transit of hydrocarbons.

New perspectives in energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and the countries in the region have become ever-more relevant since Baku began utilizing the Greece-Bulgaria gas interconnector in 2022. Azerbaijani gas supplied via this interconnector will enter the Romanian market sometime this year. Moreover, efforts are underway to connect Serbia to the overall system through an additional interconnector. Albania’s gasification campaign, including the establishment of gas pipelines and supporting infrastructure, is being carried out through investments from Baku and the involvement of Azerbaijani companies (President.az, July 7). In this, the realization of the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline will create opportunities to transport Azerbaijan’s energy resources deeper into Europe (Azertag, April 13).

In April 2023, a memorandum of understanding was signed in Sofia between Bulgartransgaz (Bulgaria), Transgaz (Romania), FGSZ (Hungary), Eustream (Slovakia) and the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan to promote cooperation on energy matters (President.az, April 25). The memorandum outlines joint development and use of the Southern Gas Corridor, with energy resources being delivered through the enhanced transmission systems of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia.

Furthermore, in July 2022, Azerbaijan and the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership in Energy. According to the document, plans are in place to double Azerbaijan’s gas supply to European markets by 2027. In 2021, Azerbaijan exported 8 bcm of natural gas to Europe. This year, the target is set at 12 bcm (525.az, April 27).

With Europe’s green energy policies, Azerbaijan and the Balkan countries have initiated collaboration in this direction as well (see EDM, March 21). As part of this effort, a working group was formed this year to lay a 1,195-kilometer electricity cable along the bottom of the Caspian to connect Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary. Currently, Azerbaijan’s export capacity is around 1,000 megawatts (MW). However, Baku is engaged in several projects that will increase Azerbaijan’s green energy export capacity by an additional 700 MW in the coming months (Renewables.az, January 11). Furthermore, Azerbaijan has signed contracts and memorandums of understanding to produce more than 25 gigawatts (GW) of recovered energy. The estimated potential for recovered energy in Azerbaijan is around 200 GW, with 157 GW located in the Caspian. Overall, Europe has been designated as the primary destination for Azerbaijan’s green energy exports, with the first recipients being the Balkan countries (Azertag, April 26).

In recent years, Baku’s relations with the Balkan states have experienced dynamic growth, characterized by reciprocal visits that have significantly expanded diplomatic ties and strengthened transportation connections. For Azerbaijan, the Balkan region serves as a strategic gateway to European markets for its energy resources. The countries of the region in turn have actively collaborated with Azerbaijan, particularly in aligning with Europe’s shift toward green energy. This cooperation has not only facilitated improved energy security in the Balkans by reducing over-reliance on only a couple external suppliers but has also fostered increased investments and the further development of key infrastructure projects. As this cooperation continues to deepen, it will play a central role in easing and increasing the delivery of goods and energy resources from Asia to Europe, to the mutual benefit of Baku and its Balkan partners.